



**INTELLIGENCE STUDIES IN FORENSIC CRIMINOLOGY
OF FUGITIVE EMANATING DEFINITIVE AND
LOCATIONAL PARAMETERS**

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A dissertation to be submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Concurrent Degree Course of Master of Arts(M.A.) and Doctor of Philosophy(Ph.D) in Criminology and Forensic Investigations

AMERICAN WORLD UNIVERSITY

Date: 28th – January, 2009



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by

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ABSTRACT

<p>Intelligence Studies in Forensic Criminology of Fugitive Emanating Definitive and Locational Parameters</p>

Nyagudi Musandu Nyagudi

This dissertation addresses the problem of manhunts, against criminal fugitives. It establishes new ways of describing and refining mechanisms and techniques, for manhunts. Methods used in this dissertation to meet those objectives, include: review of case studies, benchmarking of techniques and the analysis of techniques and concepts, which have been put forward by other scholars. Emphasis has been placed on the applicability of search techniques to a wide range of situations, and techniques for shielding the actual intentions of a search-interdiction party, from the fugitive's support network. Also derived from the analyses and case studies in this dissertation, are some innovative concepts that enhance the manhunt tradecrafts of personnel currently engaged in on-going searches for fugitives and insights into fugitive psychology. Though the case studies have got a wide range of characteristics idiosyncratic to their subjects, illustrations of similarities and correspondence in otherwise, obviously unrelated case studies, is empirical evidence of the importance of review of past cases, to assist in the refining of future manhunt operations. The dissertation, proposes various manhunt tradecraft solutions, which may be widely applicable, even in situations where search-interdiction teams have very limited operations funding, but can nevertheless assist in obtaining success by a resourceful operatives. The dissertation further seeks to give any new search-interdiction operative initial procedures and points of inquiry, while for the skilful operatives, it provides various methods for refinement of techniques and performance benchmarking.

Dedication

To my family, being your brother and son, has been a rich blessing to my life –

Thanks

HalleluYAH Amen & Amen

Nyagudi Musandu Nyagudi

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

THE CONCEPT:

Intelligence Studies in Forensic Criminology of Fugitive Emanating Definitive and Locational Parameters

In recent years, there has been an increase¹ in the number of internationally publicised cases of persons, throughout the world, who seek to evade the reach of the law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations of the United States of America and judicial systems. Some reasons for persons becoming criminal fugitives, include but are not limited to:

- escaping from the consequences of civil or criminal liability
- waging terrorist warfare against a State or the International Community

The objective of any forensic work, is to give its initiator evidence, that can stand the test of scrutiny by law enforcement agencies or judicial systems, as well as the presentation and defence of any such evidence. With a convict, suspect or defendant maintaining a fugitive status, a plaintiff, the public or prosecutor, does not have a chance to bring about closure or resolution, to a case.

Forensic criminology is the means through which criminal fugitive emanating definitive parameters are identified, acquired and analysed, with a view to locating a fugitive,

¹ One way through which increase of fugitive activity could be recognised, is by Internet websites posting bounties, e.g. www.fbi.gov

from justice. These parameters include but are not limited to : biometric, psychometric, and/or anthropometric data(be it in static) real-time or inference based formats.

Importance of psychometric parameters, emanating from a person in identifying, locating, tracking and capturing such persons, cannot be underemphasised. Boar, R. & Blundell, N. (1984: 50 - 52)² is a demonstration of how psychometric data, can be used, to control and capture an individual.

Likewise the use of anthropometric parameters, in fugitive interdiction is demonstrated in Agnew (1959)³, at a time when gathering and analysis of human intelligence, was the key to law enforcement, civilians had much less access to consumer electronic technology. Development of consumer electronics over the last several decades, has resulted in the use of biometrics and electromagnetic spectrum parameters, as means of identifying persons, both remotely and at close proximity.

² Deacon, R. *A History of British Secret Service*. The article in the book *The World's Greatest Spies and Spymasters*, refers to an earlier article in the book – *A History of British Secret Service*: this details how Rudolf Hess was lured to Great Britain during World War II. This was possible because Ian Fleming understood the role that astrology play in Rudolf's psychology, and was therefore able to manipulate him accordingly.

³ Agnew, D. *Under Cover Agent – Narcotics(1959)*, in pages 29 to 39, details the anthropometric filing system used by the International Criminal Police, to identify, locate and track criminals, the book gives many fine case of use of human intelligence methods in solving crimes.

Close proximity biometric identification techniques, include but are not limited to: iris (eye) scans, fingerprint scans, palm(hand) scans, human scent(detected by living agents – such as dogs) verification, genetic code (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis and facial recognition.

Stand-off biometric identification techniques, include but are not limited to: facial recognition, idiosyncratic human locomotion - gait, human intelligence, human scent long range tracking by use of dogs, foot print tracking and other presence signatures⁴.

Freedom of operations/action is important, when it comes to operatives on the ground executing a search and interdiction mission. Such is the growing practice⁵, where fielded forces are finding less obstacles, placed on their way by command and control authorities. Once definitive parameters are acquired and matched with locational parameters, there still remains the issue of enforcing lawful action against the freedom of a fugitive.

1.1 - ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCATIONAL AND DEFINITIVE PARAMETERS IN USE

Example 1

Locational and definitive parameters work simultaneously. An example is finding a fugitive's known electronic communications contact, on the Internet. That is a definitive parameter, that in no way gives up the secret locational parameters. It would take an Internet

⁴ The presence of a human being at a location can be determined by distinct occurrences at that location.

⁵ 'Reuters'(2008)

Protocol tracing investigation, through various Internet server systems, to gather information, that may or may not lead to the deduction of the locational parameters, required in order to locate and interdict a fugitive.

Example 2

The key word searches, by information systems, that are used by governments to monitor for enemy chatter on vast public telecommunications networks are in effect definitive parameters. These can further be refined by way of Intelligence Analysis of intercepted communication. Upon such an analysis, locational parameters are obtained, by deducing from the details of definitive parameters, of those involved in the monitored communications.

In effect, if it was only so simply, one may wish to have an all embracing, unified and simplified methodology of determining the billions or more locational and definitive parameters, that are unwittingly or otherwise naturally emanating from even the most secretive and reclusive fugitive.

But manhunts for fugitives cant be simplified or unified to a single system just yet, as even non-fugitives are (un)wittingly dispensing into their environment even more locational and definitive parameters, the clutter of which hinders, the effective interdiction of many fugitives and increases the demand for effective manhunt tradecrafts, and highly complex signals and data processing procedures.

To zero down onto a specific fugitive, a searcher must focus on correctly identifying definitive parameters, that allow for the specific search for locational parameters. The most specific definitive parameters, that can be used to identify a human being, are the genetic DNA(deoxyribonucleic acid) code. But with the current technology available to man, it is still impossible to determine from first principles the genetic code of a human being, from his oral conversations, that have been intercepted. Likewise it is impossible with current technology, to determine the genetic code of a human being from satellite imagery. This brings into focus, the issue of use of appropriate and effective methods and innovation of the same, while searching for fugitives.

1.2 - THE RESERVOIRS OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Agnew (1959) gives us a good view on how purely human intelligence (HUMINT) techniques, may be deployed on a global scale, to achieve law enforcement objectives. Depending on the set up of one's environment and lifestyle. HUMINT gathering is in many cases, one of the most affordable, low cost methods of obtaining ultra-high value information. Some of the HUMINT techniques, that are given by Agnew, include but are not limited to use of : spotters, informers, and undercover agents.

Powers(2002: 10) cites Sun – Tzu a military philosopher in the 6th century B.C., as an appreciation of intelligence that has been gather (un)wittingly from human sources, by stating, ‘...none is more intimate than the secret agent; of all rewards, none more liberal than those given to secret agents; of all matters, none is more confidential than those relating to

secret operations. He who is not a sage and wise, humane and just, cannot use secret agents. And he who is not delicate and subtle, cannot get the truth out of them.’ Sun-Tzu’s perception is true to the extent that secret operatives, are never simply objective and scientific in their work, they always or usually have personal opinions and inhibitions, that a law enforcement officer handling such operatives, must be able to discern and see through him/her, to get a clear picture of the intelligence sought.

Intelligence is in Powers’ view is indispensable, and is primarily the systematic drive to gain advantage through secret means. This would include but not be limited to collecting information, conducting secret operations (e.g. undercover and sting operations), analysing what information has been obtained and protecting a law enforcement agency from penetration, by criminal elements. Although Powers, realm of interest are primarily in the military and politics, his simplified illustration of intelligence gathering, is applicable against the world of criminal enterprise. Another of his concepts that applies to the world of investigating crime is that of COGNITIVE DISONANCE – in terms of crime, is the difficulty of coming into terms, with realities uncovered by investigations, which disturb our existing view of our environment, society or the world in general.

Where is human intelligence gathered from? A simple answer would be anywhere human being can be found. But the reality is that there are HUMAN INTELLIGENCE RESERVOIRS – places or grouping within which you can find those who know; those who matter and those who you can manipulate in one way or another to obtain information on fugitives. Simple examples of where human intelligence reservoirs exist are : in bars where

criminal congregate; in places of worship frequented by violent religious extremists; a crowd at an area of incidence, amongst a host of other places. There are no specific methods of getting to and benefiting from these reservoirs of human intelligence. By way of common sense and operational tradecrafts, penetration and exploitation methods, can be created, as and when the need arises. Searching for and finding or otherwise locating these human intelligence reservoirs is critical in determining the locational and definitive fugitive emanating parameters.

Children also comprise an important intelligence reservoir, especially when one is probing matters such as, perceptions, ideals, desires and actions of their parents. Unlike the classical Sun–Tzu subject of investigation, probing or otherwise interrogating of children especially those under the age of eight years, who have little or no reason, to lie to an investigator, offers a valuable source for information. Examples of use of children as such are Boar & Blundell (1984: 174), Eichmann was located and arrested for atrocities, he committed during World War 2, because of comments made by his daughter in school, were reported, by a fellow student to an interested parent. Sudoplatov(1995) also states how his wife, ensured that their children, did not incriminate him in any way, via their school mates.

1.3 - ASSERTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR GATHERING HUMINT.

Once immersed into a human intelligence reservoir, Sun–Tzu’s reference to the thought that, ‘...And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them.’, brings us to the methods of extracting intelligence from unwilling parties.

1.3.1 - *Assertive disbelief*

Some of the techniques that are deployed to obtain information, from the general public or otherwise persons who would not oblige if they knew your objectives, are the same when seeking information on fugitives, or kidnap victims. Skorzeny(1959), used a technique, that could be describe as *assertive disbelief*, in having the Italian public and marine personnel to disclose to him, the locational parameters of the Italian dictator Mussolini, when he was imprisoned by the Italian state towards the end of the Second World War, given that his definitive parameters(face, voice, etc) were widely known. In brief, he gave a sense of disbelief, on receiving responses, when publicly enquiring at random, about the location of Mussolini's incarceration. Members of the public would then try to convince, him via betting etc., that they were correct in their disclosure of Mussolini's location.

In this example we come across another important factor, Language of Enquiry. In Skorzeny's application of *assertive disbelief* technique, he went along with Lieutenant Wagner, who was fluent in Italian. Finally a well placed Captain Hunasis hinted that an important prisoner was being held in Sardinia. They then moved onto Sardinia, where they kept their ears 'open' for anyone who mentioned the 'Duce', and Wagner would proclaim that he was sure that he was dead – anyone who contradicted this statement, would almost certainly have first hand and extraordinary information. Upon getting the information, they would bet in a fashion, that would make them look like drunkards, to cover up their need for the information they sought. Last but not least, they placed the location under observation, and managed to rescue, the 'Duce' from captivity.

Though this method seems easy to apply, with little expense apart from travel and accommodation for implementation, the reality is that it can only work successfully, if you are looking for a very high profile fugitive, and the searchers, can blend in well with the population, which establishes the human intelligence reservoir.

Another difficulty that would face deployment of *assertive disbelief* technique, is when a known human intelligence reservoir, is a formal organisation, with internal checks. Internal checks include but are not limited to – passwords, background checks, identification documents, and biometrics. In this case a *symmetric human intelligence reservoir* must be sought. Such a grouping would comprise of member of the targeted reservoir or persons closely associated with the actual reservoir, but does not have internal checks and controls, to prevent probing by external sources. Optionally, probing could be done via ‘heat-of-the-moment’ and high pressure techniques, that leave the targeted persons, with little or no time to implement internal checks. Internal checks are a major tool, in organisation protection, as was demonstrated by von Konrat(1977).

In the writings of Josephus – *THE WORKS AND LIFE OF FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS*, as translated by Professor William Whiston, we find a *complex example of assertive disbelief* that was used by Josephus to extract information from an emissary. Rivals of Josephus had sent to him the emissary, with a deceptive message, in a bid to lure him to Jerusalem. Josephus ordered that twenty drachm^æ, be given to the emissary, though it was not due to him, to determine if he loved money, when he took the money and thanked Josephus, who

came to perceive that the man loved money and that was the weakness through which he could be subverted. Josephus then proceeded to offer the emissary a ‘bet’ (*assertive disbelief*), to give him a drachm^é for every glass of wine that he could drink - within no time, he was drunk and revealed to Josephus the conspiracy that had been hatched against him, by those who sent the emissary.

1.3.2 - Assertive Belief

An example in Sudoplatov(1995) of the opposite, *assertive belief technique* being used to gather human intelligence, is Skorzeny was outsmarted by the intelligence network ran by the Sudoplatov during the Second World War. A member of Skorzeny’s assassination mission to Iran, was in Europe, spoke to an NKVD agent who was ran by Sudoplatov, that he would be in a position to return, a favour by way of giving him Persian rags, that could only be found in Iran. Given the status of the man in the German military, his presence in Iran would be suspect.

These examples, though they are not classical criminal investigation cases, are applicable to gathering information about crime. In terms of negative effects on the subjects, there may be no difference regardless of whether the cause is military or criminal.

1.4 - THE PROBLEM : NATURE OF TODAY’S CRIMINAL FUGITIVE

In this study the focus is on today's criminal fugitive, he/she comes in many variants, but the most wanted and dangerous of the lot, often leaves a cold trail after causing a substantial financial loss and/or leaving thousands to millions of people dead. To tell their warped side of the story, they often go ahead, to taunt the victimised society by way of press releases and interviews, in the mass media.

Lamb(2007), puts across the question, '...so why, with electronic surveillance so sophisticated, that unmanned Predator drones can provide live video pictures from 26,000ft, and satellites can spot a goat on a hillside (can't the world's most wanted fugitives be found)? A special forces colonel perceives the problem, as being that law enforcement focus, so much on electronic and signals intelligence, while human intelligence gathering, a major subject of this dissertation, remains unexploited, because of language barriers.

A quick answer to our problem is that we ought to quickly and continuously identify and keep track of definitive and locational parameters, that are emanating from fugitives, given the macroscopic dimensions of this task, the parameters must either be very well chosen, or analysed by information systems such as distributed high performance computing networks, super computers and by use of artificial intelligence.

Specific areas of interest in forensic criminology, where high performance computing and artificial intelligence, would be applicable are:

- analysis of genetic parameters from sensors placed in sewer systems

- attempts at facial recognition in motor vehicles with tinted windows, in heavy traffic by use of infra-red illumination and light intensifier systems
- capturing of intelligence chatter in telecommunications networks
- placement of directional microphones on unmanned aerial vehicles, which have noise suppressed propulsion
- analysis of idiosyncratic spending habits, by way of determining a consumer habit discerning signatures – i.e. at its finest, one would be detected by way of his or her shopping habits, regardless of who does the shopping on their behalf.

Lamb(2007) gives an example of a hero to the *Waziris* of Pakistan, who was a villain to the British Colonial administrators in Pakistan – the Fakir of Ippi, who had once got a total of about 40,000 British and Indian troops searching for him, yet he died of natural causes in his bed in 1960 – such a feat was made possible by two underlying factors, these being a friendly host population and a terrain that is not suitable for search operations.

1.5 - USING FORENSIC CRIMINOLOGY TO DETERMINE AND EXPLOIT THE RECIDIVIST NATURE OF THE FUGITIVE

Of all the mistakes, that a criminal makes, those that are as a result of his/her *modus operandi* are of particular interest, when one is in pursuit of a fugitive. Anthropometric – behavioural traits of a criminal, are actually the initiators of the processes or occurrences, that lead to their eventual arrest/capture.

Of these, the behavioural trait of a criminal, that lends itself to exploitation by law enforcement to achieve the arrest of an individual, is recidivism. Agnew(1959:131) gives an example of a ‘William Levin’ who had just completed a 17 year prison term, and went back straight into the narcotics trade, upon his release. In Levin’s case, two reasons that may have led to this recidivist trait, are:

- the attraction of enormous profits
- expert narcotic dealers may have no other criminal trade – this is however very unlikely as wide range of criminal expertise, are required if one is to sustain a viable narcotics trafficking underworld enterprise.

Geis, G. & Meier, R. (1977), has several illustrations of recidivism, it also terms criminals who exhibit it, as habitual. In their definition, a habitual criminal, is a person who has been convicted not less than four times, for felonies. In their writings, they also term recidivism as the possession of two or more criminal convictions or administrative decisions.

If we extrapolate, the latter concept of recidivism, to other psychological realms of a fugitive’s character, and assume that persons wanted for escaping from law enforcement agencies and judicial processes are recidivist, as they are wanted for an offence, in addition, to their offence of escaping from the reach of the law – we find an important assumption for capturing a fugitive. The assumption is that a habitual criminal (a recidivist) is liable to making a serious mistake, that could cost his/her life and liberty more than once.

One of the forms, through which recidivism, expresses itself, is that a recidivist is liable to return to a place they visit frequently in support of their fugitive status, even if it is known to them that such visits may cost them, their lives or liberty. This allows us to draw up locational and definitive parameters, relevant for use in capturing such a person e.g. by way of ambush: The Ambush Value of Information.

This use of the recidivist trait in criminal fugitives, just one of the many methods, that would be deployed, in forensic criminology, to bring a culprit to book.

1.6 - DEDUCTION OF LOCATIONAL PARAMETERS FROM INTERNET BASED FUGITIVE EMANATING DEFINITIVE PARAMETERS

Investigating and locating criminals in its finest practice, would embrace on the use of totally remotely controlled and automated systems. A good example of a remote and automated investigation would be the simple Internet protocol tracing of the source of a criminal declaration or activity on the Open Internet. It is a web based investigation that assists, one to locate a criminal. Such a search would be conducted via the use of inspections of routing records, server audit trails, user logs, amongst a host of other digital records. The co-operation to the telecommunication service providers, who were involved in routing the messages or commands, would be required, in order for one to determine the identity of the offender and to locate an offender.

But in a case where the offender is moving frequently or taking deliberate measures, to obscure his/her identity and technical details on the Internet, IP tracing is no longer the tool of choice, but a more successful, tried and tested approach would be the use of artificial intelligence and operations research methodologies.

A superb way of deducing locational parameters, is by way of geographic profiling – use of mathematical / statistical models, in a bid to determine:

- the most likely location of a serial offenders home, work, social venues and travel routes.
- Catchment area where the offender obtains victims from.
- Time, distance and speed calculations in relation to an offence.
- Schematic maps, that illustrate different locational parameter probabilities of occurrence.

Geographic profiling therefore enables an operations manager to economise as well as prioritise in an investigation. As detailed on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police website⁶, geographic profiling does not utilise internet based fugitive emanating parameters, but is supplemented by the practice of psychological / behavioural profiling.

If we are to embrace the concepts of artificial intelligence in analysis of web content and the Dark Web project⁷, whereby concepts of Intelligence and Security Informatics come into play, a futuristic application of such technology in fugitive hunts, would take the form of a stylometric authorship identification, which would be followed by a content analysis,

⁶ The Royal Canadian Mounted Police webpage on Geographic Profiling is cited in the Bibliography

⁷ University of Arizona's Dark Web project is cited in the bibliography.

allowing for the profiling of an author, and in some cases allowing for the geographical profiling of an author – a process that eventually leads to the locating of the author.

In order for a refined search of a fugitive, resulting in a potential physical location to occur, the following parameters, must come into play:

- The fugitive obsessively uses the Internet for publicity.
- The fugitive obsessively instructs followers, on how to go about using the Internet for publicity.
- The fugitive takes no precaution to randomise, points of Internet usage access.
- Persons who know the fugitive and actively monitor his/her activities, use the Internet to publicise the fugitive, with or without express consent of the fugitive.
- Persons searching for the fugitive have got the relevant systems, know-how and techniques, to carry out scientific analysis of web content.
- Persons searching for the fugitive, have got the wherewithal to act on results they obtain, from analysis of web content.
- That the web content used in a fugitive search analysis, is devoid of intentional deception, but those creating and disseminating it.

1.7 - IMPORTANCE OF SECRECY IN FUGITIVE SEARCHES

The essence of all intelligence work, including the domain of law enforcement, is to gain operational advantages over rivals, by way of secret means. A definition by Powers

(2002: 343) observes that a secret matter is one that is to be unknown, unobserved or unanticipated, in order for it to be successful. We can therefore comfortably state that:

- Secret operations relating to the search of fugitives, are only to be known by as many people and is necessary to make them, successful and as few people as possible, to keep them unknown, to any fugitive being probed.
- Secrecy in fugitive searches, ensures that the fugitive is not alarmed, thereby changing his/her *modus operandi* – i.e. by changing some or most of his/her definitive and locational parameters

According to Powers (2002: 374), there must be a balance between field operations and analysis of situations and reports, in order for any intelligence outfit to be successful, in its undertakings. This is highlighted by the question therein, ‘What use is a Cray supercomputer at the Counter-Terrorism Center, if you have got nothing to put into it’. This question is posed by Robert Baer, a twenty-year veteran of numerous field operations for the Central Intelligence Agency, who was alarmed at the decline of field operations in favour of report generation, during the Clinton presidency. Not only must secrets, be secret but they must also be relevant – before a fitting intelligence analysis can be undertaken. Without the relevant definitive and locational parameters, even the best supercomputer and its software environments, can offer no assistance in a fugitive search.

**CHAPTER 2 – INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FOR FORENSIC CRIMINOLOGY
REPORTING ON FUGITIVE EMANATING DEFINITIVE AND LOCATIONAL
PARAMETERS**

Information taken, from known criminal fugitive case reports, be they first hand accounts, mass media features, and other available input that are relevant contributions towards our understanding of fugitive conduct, must be analysed in an attempt to deduce parameters that improve our understanding of past, present and future conduct of criminal fugitives, thereby improving the probability of finding and containing such persons. Fugitives, may be part of schemes to feed the media, law enforcement agencies and other relevant bodies/persons, with deceptive information – in a bid to mislead people involved in investigations, that are geared towards their interdiction. An assumption is therefore made that part of the process of developing an actionable forensic criminology report as to the conduct and operations of a fugitive, involves the process of determining truth, from lie.

In a City like Nairobi in Kenya, most people learn of the fugitive status of persons, by way of the mass media. Thereafter more information is obtained from the statutory officers' reports or other sources and persons who have been following up on the case status, of a declared fugitive.

Customers of Intelligence Analysis reports on fugitive emanating definitive and locational parameters, generated by human analysts or other systems, include but are not limited to :Police, Investigators and Bounty Hunters

Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI), is the specialisation, that dealings with information systems, used in apprehending of fugitives. The end game in deploying ISI technology, in a search would be to get parameters generated, that when analysed would lead to the location and capture of a fugitive.

Unlike conventional intelligence analysis, when in pursuit of a fugitive the searchers are involved in a zero-sum game because at the end of every operation, either the fugitive is captured or remains out of reach from law enforcement. There are no mid-points in manhunts. To a lesser extent, concise knowledge of parameters may be used to make life difficult or otherwise unbearable for a fugitive – in such cases a searcher is either unwilling or unable to act on intelligence received.

Ambiguity and uncertainty as to the whereabouts of a fugitive, are the reason for initiation of a process of gathering or acquiring fugitive emanating parameters. Inability to exploit these parameters, once they are acquired or collected, is to be considered a structural defect in the operations mechanisms deployed against a fugitive. By the very fragmentary nature of intelligence on a fugitive, deduction and trained intuition are in most cases, readily deployable tools, to achieve location of the subject and capture. An objective of the fugitive's *modus operandi*, would be to render an intelligence analysis, leading to his/her capture to be of low probability and demanding extraordinarily high specification.

In any fugitive search, intelligence collection and analysis methodology that does not result in the solution of a fugitive case, if redeployed without re-evaluation becomes a *logical fugitive search resource trap*, as it withholds, potential fugitive interdiction resources from other operations or analytic methods, that would result in a successful operation.

Deception mechanisms, that are deployed by a fugitive, to keep searchers off his/her trail, are not undesirable, if they can be positively identified and fully understood. Like other fugitive emanating parameters, they can be harnessed in a bid to better understand and locate their source.

Fugitive emanating parameters, are diverse - more than a single skill set are required for their effective interpretation. A person involved in a search, must have the skills to route various types of parameters collected, to other persons who are capable of interpreting and fully understanding them. Furthermore, obtaining feedback from interpreters or other exploiters is essential. But in most cases, where the interpreter/exploiter is a government and the searcher an independent individual, seeking to obtain such feedback is at its best frustrating and in the worst case futile. This is a human communication type that could be defined as a *fugitive search dysfunctional involuntary monologue*. Under these circumstances, the searcher would only have the option of seeking to gather more fugitive emanating parameters, and to refine his understanding of the situation.

When a fugitive disappears ‘completely’, leading to a cold trail - the parameters, that were already acquired, should be examined by a broader range of analysts and more vigorous processes of analysis. The reason for this ‘second-look’ approach, is that fugitive ‘disappearance’, may not solely be due to the efforts of the fugitive, but the inept approach the searchers and they analysts, have deployed.

2.1 - QUALITIES OF AN EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS REPORT OF FUGITIVE EMANATING DEFINITIVE AND LOCATIONAL PARAMETERS

The best practice would be for a fugitive search-interdiction team, to obtain a report that:

1. gives an accounting of real opportunities for capturing or controlling a fugitive.
2. gives an accounting of the fugitives lifestyle, security and *modus operandi*.
3. defines and demonstrates a fugitive’s motivation.
4. defines and identifies the fugitives support network, and their functions, as well as providing specific evidence of the same.
5. defines that process of parameter acquisition with specifics.
6. gives suggestions of tactics and strategies that could be used against the fugitive.
7. lists any other facts/parameters, that have to be established by the searchers, as well as limitations of the report itself.

2.2 - METHODS OF REASONING DEPLOYED

A specific school of reasoning e.g. induction, deduction, trained intuition or abduction, cannot be described as the most favourable, for getting results, in intelligence analysis for a fugitive search. Reasoning methods to be deployed to bring about a full understanding of the parameters, is wholly dependent on the quantity and quality of parameters collected/acquired, as well as their rate of acquisition. In fact different analysts could be given the same facts, to see if they come to the same conclusion using different methods, unlike in other fields of intelligence analysis, there is little or no room for a margin of error when it comes to locating and capturing a fugitive. If the different analysts come up with different conclusion that are not of a highly specific nature, the question, why?, is a well placed basis for another analysis or parallel verification systems.

Whereby the searcher's reasoning and behaviour is geared towards maximisation of acquisition of parameters, that avail opportunities for fugitive capture, by way of identifying and highlighting the fugitive's vulnerabilities – the fugitive seeks to minimise the emission of parameters, thereby reducing the opportunities for his/her capture, by way of eliminating the vulnerabilities.

2.3 - THE CRIMINAL NATURE OF THE TERRORIST FUGITIVE

In a collection of scholar papers edited by Badey (2002), we are better able to come to an understanding, on the issue of asymmetric warfare by way of terrorism, and its fugitive perpetrators. In these studies, we see that terrorism involves three basic components: the perpetrator, the victim and the target of violence. The perpetrator uses violence and destruction of property against victim and by the very nature of a terror attack, its hidden perpetrator expects to send a message to a target (usually a government or community) using criminal means. The target is expected by the perpetrator, to respond positively to the ‘message’. Fear is the catalyst or amplifier of the terrorist communication mechanism, and is hoped to elicit a desired response.

By the very nature of terrorism, an attack is a criminal act, and the perpetrator is unable to overcome the target in conventional warfare and has to hide to avoid the consequences of a reprisal attack by the target. The terrorist is a fugitive who hides away from or within the search space of operations of the targeted administration. Acts of terror are repeated from time to time. This act of repetition is important in determining the signature of its perpetrators by way of forensic examination of evidence from past acts to determine location, weapons, configuration, timing and psychology(of the terrorists).

Terrorism can be opportunistic, hitting at targets in a random manner or otherwise selective, hitting at symbolic targets or by use a symbolic methodology. When terrorists carry out a symbolic attack, they hope that their target deploys the *potterian maxim* in

reasoning, i.e. *'I know it when it see it'- thus reducing the need for the terrorists, to open direct communications with their targeted administration, which may lead to their location.*

Mere threats in most cases are viewed as insufficient by terrorists, to elicit a desired response. The method of choice, which gives strength to terrorist organisations – violence, is also the greatest weakness, as it is the source of forensic evidence that is eventually used to track down terrorists.

Apart from forensic evidence emanating from an act, terrorist manifestos are another source of parameters that are used to determine the sophistication and potential location, of its fugitive perpetrators. Manifestos overtly contain information on motivation, intentions, actors, effects. Covertly, they can be analysed for a wide range of forensic content e.g. authorship, sophistication, production, distributorship, etc. Counter-terrorism by a targeted administration, can never be successful without success at intelligence work, to determine the definitive parameters of a terrorist organisation and the actual location of the source emanating those parameters.

In Badey (2002), Rapport's contention, in his paper – 'The Fourth Wave – September 11 in the History of Terrorism, is of the opinion, that perpetrators of terror, in conflicts such as Jewish Palestine and Ireland, were effective to the extent that the key actors were never found even though long and costly operations were undertaken over familiar territory, i.e. the key actors were effective at being fugitives.

While on the hand in Badey (2002), Yoram Schweitzer gives light to another form of terrorism, suicide terrorism. This is defined to be a politically motivated attack perpetrated by self-aware individual(s) who actively and purposely cause their own death along with the destruction chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his/her mission. Schweitzer's school of thought, makes it clear, that the perpetrator of an attack of suicide terror, must remain a fugitive, to the extent that his operation is anticipated by the targeted administration. With the knowledge, that repetition defines terror, once an act of suicide terror is undertaken against an administration one of the options of counter-terror, is to identify the remains of past attackers, gather evidence of their *modus operandi*, and make an attempt to capture future potential attackers, before they act on their intentions.

The involvement of states in creating safe havens for terrorists largely reduces the options for probing search spaces from where the locational and definitive parameters, of the terrorists in question are emanating. A fugitive status allows a terrorist to pursue the achievement of their objectives with extraordinarily criminal means, while escaping punishment or reprisals of the system of justice, which seeks to protect the target.

Terrorism of most kinds, thrives on mass media, to get its message to more persons, who are in turn expected to pressurise the targeted administration, into adopting a suitable stance in matters that are held as important by the terrorists. Intelligence analysis of mass media content covering terrorism, should reveal details including but not limited to the following information:

- identification of the producers, sources, and/or authors at least by way of their style.
- determining the psychological disposition of the terrorists.
- attempting to establish location of production , authorship and distributorship.
- attempting to establish any codified secret communication channel used by the terrorists via the mass media.
- giving news updates on status of various terrorist fugitives.
- assessing materials for potential reaction to the same by wanted persons, given that their psychological profiles may have been already established.
- assessing media materials to determine the motivation and desires of the supporters of wanted persons.
- assessing media materials for any potential deceptive or diversionary information, fed to journalists by wanted persons.

In the absence of field patrols, physical searches, operations funding and ambushes, the monitoring of informative sources, informers(both willing and unwilling), the media and observable occurrences) remain, the best way of effectively searching for a fugitive and setting up an eventual cost effective system of interdiction.

In effect, media content in an area affected by terrorism has a signature that defines the terrorist. This signature defines:

- *modus operandi*: location, techniques, target selection.
- timing of terror attacks.
- choice of media house notified by terrorists of their activities.

- choice of targeted victims.

The effect of media monitoring as a tool of intelligence gathering, is evidenced by the unwillingness of the world's most wanted man Osama bin Laden, to utilise it directly and frequently.

In Badey (2002), Talbot has some interesting insights on involvement of women in terrorism and their signature levels in the same activities, in her research, it is stated that, '... the female murderer has proved herself as easily as deadly as any male and certainly more insidious. Her motives, as general rule, lack clearheaded and darkly reasoned purpose of the male. Whim and fancy often rule here. Long smouldering emotions often burn themselves out only after the victim of the female killer – whether male or female – has been subjected to excruciating agony. Seldom is there the quick clean stroke as with the male'

Another interesting paper collected by Badey is that of Jamieson, titled: 'Mafiosi and Terrorists: Italian Women in Violent Organisations'. It gives us an insight of the mentality of women in organisations such as the Red Brigades and Mafia – to them, their membership and activities, are more of a way of life and are as such at a point of no return, by the time they join clandestine organisation. This approach to involvement with illegal organisations, means that they in turn relinquish their membership of past organisations and social organisations.

An interesting revelation by Jamieson is the importance of religion or cultural ceremonies in the lives of persons involved in clandestine organisations to the extent that they cannot avoid attending the same. As such their presence, overt or covert is to be expected at such ceremonial venues – e.g. baptism, marriages, funerals. This knowledge can then be exploited to bring about their interdiction. Compiling a detailed database of any such ceremonies and their potential locations, is important for fugitive hunting surveillance spotters.

The children of marriages of parents involved in clandestine organisations whether infant or grown up, are the life blood of future membership of the organisation. This means that they are a special-interest to their parents, and are therefore potential focal points for communications or presence of their parents.

Bulmer-Thomas of the Chatham House also contributes in Badey (2002), by going on to postulate that terrorist organisations do come to an end either due to implosion of the perpetrating organisation e.g. the Baader–Meinhoff gang in Germany or effective intelligence work e.g. the collapse of the Medellin Cartel in Colombia – or because political initiatives render terror activities inappropriate, e.g. Northern Ireland.

But without a proper isolation and identification of its signature traits, terrorism could be the victor. A specific example would be the nature of Afghanistan to the extent that the September 11, 2001 attacks originated from its territory.

For a terrorist to be effective, he/she must use conventional, unconventional and/or otherwise improvised weapons. The detection of these in concealment, storage or in transport, are critical in locating the fugitive terrorists, who use them. To achieve this:

- weapon dumps that are located can be put under visual or electronic surveillance
- Weapon detectors e.g. gamma ray and neutron flux detectors, metal detectors, or dogs can be used to uncover weapons in transport, according to Gellman's detailed paper in Badey (2002).
- Possession of dual use materials or equipment may be cause for further surveillance to detect manufacture of weapons.
- Electronic, audio, chemical or optical signature of weapons in use, even before their use is fully effected.

If the paper of Spencer and Lightfoot, together of that of Schweitzer, are all taken into consideration, we have a combination of suicide terror and a fugitive lifestyle – the Disease Infected Disease Delivery Suicidal Fugitive, bearing a disease such as small pox. The location and control of such a fugitive would depend on:

- geographical profiling of victim movement.
- Epidemiological mapping of affected area.
- Early detection and identification of symptoms of the disease.
- Use of high resolution thermal imaging in public spaces.
- Use of high resolution symptom recognition cameras, with use of artificial intelligence.

- Detection systems capable of taking and testing samples from individuals within their daily routines.

The advent of acts of mega-terror such as the 9/11 attacks and the massive disruption that they caused, are important in understanding the massive amount of time, manpower and resources deployed in the attempt to bring about the interdiction of fugitive terrorists. In each and every case, a wide range of expertise has to be deployed in profiling the perpetrators and attempting to allocate search resources in the most effective way. One factor which must never be overlooked is the dedication, motivation, thoroughness and intellectual capital base of the law enforcement officers leading the search – it is the key determining factor, even when all other resources are in short supply.

2.4 - INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF A REPORT ON A FUGITIVE

Earlier in this chapter, we have described some qualities that would be desired in an Intelligence Report. More is expected of a *First Class Value Intelligence Report on a Fugitive*. Some of the specifics that should be clarified so as to make an intelligence report on a fugitive first rated are:

- a. Is the fugitive dead or alive?
- b. Has a biometric verification of the located fugitive been undertaken?
- c. Does consumption of the report lead to general location and movement areas of the fugitive?
- d. Does consumption of the report lead to specific location and continuous optical

- surveillance of the fugitive?
- e. Does the report establish details of contacts and support networks of the fugitive?
 - f. Does the report offer definitive anthropometric data about the fugitive?
 - g. Does the report suggest operating procedure and fugitive interdiction methodologies?
 - h. Does the report have verifiable content sources?
 - i. Does the report give operating budget estimates for its effecting?
 - j. Does the report give an estimated expiry date or circumstances of variable data therein?
 - k. Does the report detail, the security plan, counter-measures, and escape strategies, that may be deployed by the fugitive?

2.5 - QUALITIES OF AN ORGANISATION AND OPERATIVE(S) TO ACT ON A FUGITIVE MANHUNT REPORT

Once a fugitive hunt report has obtained sufficient information to warrant the execution of an operation the next level of quality assurance is that of ascertaining the operations preparedness of the personnel to be deployed on the interdiction mission. It is necessary that these operational qualities be established and tested continuously, even when there is no immediate demand for their utilisation. By the time that there is need for an effective interdiction party, it is usually too late to start recruiting or training one.

The qualities, that should be established for operatives and organisations, involved in fugitive hunts are:

1. An organisation should have a dynamic internal counter-intelligence infrastructure to act on any potential espionage, leakages or subterfuge by members – this reduces the possibility of wastage of a first class fugitive hunt intelligence report.
2. An organisation must have the resources and resourcefulness to promptly verify a report.
3. An organisation must have trained and/or experienced operatives, who can take on the fugitive, and any counter-measures deployed by the fugitive against them.
4. An organisation must have the equipment and vehicles required in a fugitive interdiction operation.
5. An organisation must ensure that the equipment and vehicles in its inventory, are in good working condition, and have the capability to work in the specific operating environment.
6. Once the interdiction team is on the ground, and has isolated the fugitive, the entire decision making process for the operation, must be transferred to them, as those higher up in the chain of command elsewhere, cannot possibly have a sufficient understanding of the situation.
7. A first class report, must not be procrastinated upon, immediate isolation of the fugitive, is a top priority. Operations teams must always be on the standby, or otherwise available on short notice.

These are the minimum standards necessary for an effective operations group. It is worth noting that their application and verification can be almost if not actually intuitive, as the demand for action may not always allow for the furnishing of an elaborate

checklist. To make it to the necessary level of proficiency, continuous practice and training on almost real life fugitive interdiction problems and situations is the way forward.

Practice and training also make it possible to eliminate from possibility of the deployment of equipment, personnel and methods, that might compromise an operation. But at the same time, instructors should be on the look out for any methods or simulators, that introduce negative training by way of introduction non-applicable techniques, which are only vital to the achievement of training but offer no value to an operative in an actual field operation.

**CHAPTER 3 – CASE STUDIES ILLUSTRATING EXISTENCE AND USE OF
FUGITIVE EMANATING DEFINITIVE AND LOCATIONAL PARAMETERS IN
MANHUNTS**

3.1 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 1

Fugitive: Bernard Matheri Thuo alias ‘Rasta’

Biodata: Age approx. 35-40 years, Gender – male, alleged violent criminal

Case Status: Fugitive Interdicted

Case details according to Kareithi (2008, July): ‘Rasta’ was killed on September 1, 1997 in his home in Central Kenya. It took a contingent of 40 armed police officers to set up a successful ambush while ‘Rasta’ had visited his wife¹ Jane Wangechi at his home. ‘Rasta’ was declared a wanted man on August 21, 1995. He had survived an earlier police ambush on April 10, 1994, and had a cash bounty of two hundred thousand Kenya Shillings on his head.

3.2 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 2

Fugitive: aliases – Sophia Abdi a.k.a Timiro Farah Ayanle

Biodata: Age – approx. 21 – 30 years, Gender – female, alleged narcotics trafficker

Case status: Unsolved

Case details according to Ochami (2008, September), is that ‘Sophia’ was arrested in Wilson Airport on July 18, 2001 by the Kenya Anti-Narcotic Police Unit in Nairobi, Kenya, when she was found in possession of 6.5kg heroine. She never removed her religious veil –

¹ Parameter – an easily observable non-fugitive sexual partner.

‘*hijab*’, making it impossible for law enforcement agents, who worked in the corridors of the court, to readily master her facial identity. During visiting hours in the court cells, on July 19, 2001, as visitors, streamed into the cells, she changed her clothes and left the court cells as the visitors left. No one amongst the law enforcement officers guarding the cell exit areas could readily identify her, or if they did, they had been compromised.

There was a road accident involving the prison van, that ‘Sophia’ allegedly boarded on her way back to the remand prison. The prison van did not show any sign of exit and the accident was therefore considered to be a diversion. Another potential diversion, was the claim by a relative, that ‘Sophia’ was killed in Dubai two years ago. ‘Sophia’ has since her escape communicated² with contacts in Kenya.

3.3 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 3

Fugitive: Nicholas Mwea alias ‘Wakinyonga’

Biodata: Age – approx. 35 years, Gender – male, alleged violent robber

Case status: Fugitive Interdicted

Cased details according to Ombuor (2008), are that ‘Wakinyonga’, an alleged violent robber, who was sought in connection with various robberies and murders was gunned down by Kenya Police officers on June 27, 1978. What made ‘Wakinyonga’ dangerous, is that he had gone past the point of no return – he felt that he had nothing to lose by engaging in violent crime and anticipated his violent death, to the extent that he dug a 30-foot deep pit in his home, on the outskirts of Nairobi, to act as his grave.

² Parameter – her location can be obtained by monitoring her contacts and tracing her communications

On the fateful day, he was trailed into the Nyakiami lodge and restaurant by a female informer³ who immediately left the venue. ‘Wakinyonga’ then left and returned with firearms and started threatening patrons – Unknown to him some of them were police men, while other officers, had sealed all possible exit routes outside. A shoot out ensued and ‘Wakinyonga’ was killed.

At his funeral many criminals were arrested, as they had identified themselves, by way of their similar dressing⁴. ‘Wakinyonga’ had invested proceeds from his criminal activities in real estate⁵.

3.4 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 4

Fugitive: Joseph Kony

Biodata: Age: about 47 years , Gender – male, alleged war criminal

Case Status: Unsolved

Case Details:

According to Green (2008), the ‘Lord’s Resistance Army – LRA’ founder and commander Joseph Kony, leads an army comprising primarily of abducted children, in a violent insurgency, that has particularly affected Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan and from 2008, the northern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The International Criminal Court, at the request of the Ugandan Government, issued an indictment against

³ Parameters – anthropometric parameters: facial, behavioural and voice recognition, by the female informer lead to his demise

⁴ Parameters - clothing

⁵ Parameters – assets and/or spending patterns

Joseph Kony. Kony claims to take his orders from the spirit world – his insurgency was probably initiated, by the defeat of the ‘Holy Spirit’ army of Alice Lakwena in October 1987 and the humiliation suffered by the Acholi people, as a result of their siding with the earlier government regimes that were overthrown by the National Resistance Army and Movement.

Amongst the crimes that Kony is accused of are:

- recruitment of child soldiers
- Mass Rape Incidences
- Various forms of torture and assault

Despite his seemingly low level of education, Kony seems to have an above average understanding of modern warfare to the extent that it has been exceedingly difficult to hunt him down by methods such as telecommunications monitoring – as he is aware that direction finding technology and other tracking technologies, can be used to map out the co-ordinates of his location.

Loyalty in the LRA, is instilled primarily by way of fear e.g.

- the execution of top commanders, who are seen as potential future threats to the authority of Kony.
- Clubbing to death of low level members who are perceived to be disloyal, a punishment that is carried out by one’s peers on orders from their commanders.
- Brutalisation of the public.

The first major response to the LRA insurgency, was the movement of the local population into ‘protection’ camps, but no major effort, was made to specifically targeting Kony, even when his forces were within reach of Ugandan Government forces before he moved his operating base to the northern areas of Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, from his earlier location in Southern Sudan.

A Catholic Church leader Father Carlos based in Northern Uganda, describes Kony as a psychopath – in his own words, describing Kony’s behaviour are that, ‘he may be laughing at one moment, and in the next instance, without good reason, he would be threatening death.’ But behind his seemingly insane behaviour, Kony has a broad range of credible advisors and able supporters, who both equip him, as well as give him the knowledge base that he needs to remain one step a head of conventional law enforcement – this is very evident in Green (2008). It is also clearly that he has a Human Intelligence Reservoir spanning Uganda, Congo, Sudan and going into the industrialised developed world.

Kony is said to return to Awere hills in Northern Uganda every three years – this is the place where he set off to start his insurgency. Despite the best efforts of the Ugandan forces, they have never captured him at this place. My understanding is that Green (2008) illustrates that most of the government forces who have been deployed against the LRA, are involved in a military protection effort, or the occasional all-out assault as there is little evidence of effective special operations forces engaging in systematic and long term counter-revolutionary warfare. Even though the forces seeking to interdict Kony from Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, may describe themselves as special-operations

forces, their methods as a matter of public record, do not illustrate such a qualification. The best effort was an ill-fated attempt made by the ‘Kaibiles’, a jungle special operations group from Guatemala, under the auspices of the United Nations peace keeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is also clear that LRA has from time to time, received covert support from members of the local population in Northern Uganda – this is a factor that has made it impossible for the rebels to be completely isolated, or for the government to effectively use the local population against them. The reasons for this local support of LRA are diverse, but the key factors, being:

- a. supplying rebels ensures the survival of captured relatives, who have been ‘turned’ into soldiers.
- b. There are various forms of profit or other benefit that are derived from trading with or supporting the rebels.
- c. There are locals who are genuinely motivated by rebel doctrine.

Another tactical problem, is use of helicopters to counter the rebels. This definitely cannot be effective but can only supplement an effective ground effort because helicopters, cannot loiter over target areas indefinitely, and fully exploit fugitive emanating parameters, which can primarily be gathered by ground based troops. Rebels are skilled at deception, e.g. walking backwards to mislead trackers.

Operation ‘Iron Fist’ in March 2002, was a major attempt by the Ugandan government to crush the LRA and capture Kony but it probably failed due to the process of seeking consent to act from the Government of Sudan in Khartoum – i.e. the rebels must have had more than

enough warning, by way of the mass media that the government would act against their village based camps. Green (2008) provides an example of government troops tracking down rebels through the stalking of self appointed mediators (Catholic clergy men). This has not been successful as the rebel are aware of it and at times, their key commanders do not turn up, for peace meetings for this reason. Rebels are also known to take action against those in possession of bicycles in their areas of operations, as these provide civilians, with a quick way of contacting law enforcement for help.

To capture a skilled fugitive, there must be an exerted effort but there are various ways in which members of the military have been profiteering from the conflict and this has kept them from having an interest in ending the war. A number of military men have businesses within their area of operations. Other acts of indiscipline that have contributed to the inefficiency of Ugandan forces at acquiring and exploiting fugitive emanating parameters, include but are not limited to:

- a. routine sexual assault against civilians.
- b. Active exploitation of natural resources in the areas of conflict on behalf of private beneficiaries.
- c. Embezzlement of military funds.

The military doctrine of the LRA which is defined by Joseph Kony, has the following key points:

- a. the overthrow of the central government of Uganda.

- b. The restoration of the Acholi culture – which is the basis of Kony’s ancestry
- c. The rule of Uganda according to the biblical Ten Commandments, which is often subverted by Kony’s style of leadership

Though Kony’s battle seems remote, it ‘rings a bell in the ear of citizens’ of all of Uganda’s neighbouring countries, where the Constitutions that they adopted at attainment Independence from the Colonial powers, have failed to resolve the competing special-interest of various ethnic groups, leading to violence and instability.

A basic psychological profile of Kony is as follows:

- a. a psychopath who uses death and torture as an instrument of instilling fear, control and discipline.
- b. Undoubtedly has the desire to rule the whole of Uganda, but is frustrated by his lack of resources, skills and personnel, to achieve his objectives.
- c. Appreciates a life of luxury and tries to mimic the same even in very difficult environments.
- d. Enjoys his absolute rule over his guerrillas, and control that he is unlikely to relinquish it.
- e. Willing to take and effect advice from more knowledgeable external supporters to his cause.
- f. Fully understands the gravity of the charges against him.
- g. Is more than cautious when it comes to security, and uses death as a therapy to

calm his paranoia.

There are several factors, that have contributed to giving Kony, a natural hiding space:

- vast sparsely populated areas,
- jungle cover,
- mountainous terrain,
- civil conflicts between other parties, in his areas of operation.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in Nairobi, on 9th January 2005, stabilised the region of South Sudan, to the extent that it became an unsuitable operations base for LRA activities. These have now been moved to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central Africa Republic both of which have ongoing civil wars and weak central governments, that are incapable of controlling their vast territory.

During Operation Iron Fist, Kony took cover in the rugged terrain of the Imatong Mountains in South Sudan. Kony's first priority is known to be his personal safety and his willingness to change his geographical area of operations to suit the times, is a contributing factor to his protection from law enforcement agencies.

In a December 2008 operation there is a better understanding of how Kony has managed to remain out of reach for Ugandan government forces these being:

- he does not trust the government or its mediators as honest and always views actual talks as opportunities for ambush/entrapment of LRA by his pursuers.
- The forces searching for him seem to be incompetent.
- LRA seems to have a very good understanding of what electronic tracking entails.
- On one hand Kony's pursuers have underestimated his capabilities, on the other hand, Kony seems to have over estimated the abilities of his pursuers.

According to the VOA(Voice of America)⁶, Kony was to sign a peace agreement with President Museveni of Uganda, in early December 2008. Africa's most wanted fugitive, was to sign the deal after going through confidence building measures with Museveni, via satellite phone – but by reading Green (2008), it is clear that Kony would not engage in such a conversation via satellite phone, as he views it as an opportunity for the Ugandan government and its allies to track him down electronically. The anticipated phone call by Kony to Museveni, was therefore a non-starter. That the VOA noted the story is an indication that the government of the United States of America, which has the capability to monitor, track and locate satellite phone communications, must have noted the same and acted accordingly.

As if expecting entrapment, Kony 'changed his mind' and did not make the phone call. Notably shortly thereafter, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and South Sudan launched a massive ground and air assault against LRA camps, an attack that Kony suspects was organised long before the failed peace talks of November-December 2008.

⁶ Full Internet url/website of the VOA story is listed in the bibliography.

This was the second chance in 2008 for a peace settlement after the failed talks of April, 2008. Probably due to warnings from his sponsors or due to his effective field surveillance Kony snubbed the talks he considered were an attempt to assassinate him.

The massive and co-ordinated nature of the military attack that followed the failed talks, shows that Kony's suspicions as to the intentions of the mediating government and its allies were not misplaced. Furthermore, by way of mass media, it had become a matter of public record, that the military forces of Uganda, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo were moving closer to his camps. The non-surgical nature of the military attack that was intended to 'neutralise' Kony, now makes it even harder for his pursuers to ever attempt again to make it possible to use the guise of peace talks to capture Africa's Most Wanted Man.

From the latest operation, towards the end of the year 2008, we learn that:

- a fugitive seeks to profile his pursuers, just as much as they seek to profile him.
- An operation against a fugitive is almost always futile, regardless of his/her signature of presence, unless those seeking to capture him/her have positive visual surveillance and recognition of the specific subject of their pursuit.
- Cessation of hostilities allowed for a search for Kony, but this exercise was not thoroughly executed.

3.5 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 5

Fugitive: Osama bin Laden

Biodata: Age 51, Gender – male, alleged Terror Mastermind and Financier of Terrorism

Case Status: Unsolved

Case details:

Lamb (2007) goes back into history, to give us a preview of what bothers most bin Laden hunters, ‘the Waziristan leader of a 1930’s uprising against the British, who was called the Fakir of Ippi. At one point forty thousand British and Indian troops were searching for him, yet he was never found, and died of natural cause in his bed in 1960.’ - a prospect that many operatives in the so called ‘War on Terror’, do not want to contemplate.

Moore (2008), gives a general overview on the failed operation to capture bin Laden in Afghanistan in 2001, and an optimistic overview of the future prospects of the United States of America government in the same endeavour in the future. Many of Moore’s assessments are supported by the television media broadcasts at the time after 9/11 terror acts – media outlets that have corresponding material include: Sky News, CNN(Cable News Network), and BBC(British Broadcasting Corporation).

We learn from Moore, that fighters, guards and forces guarding a fugitive are a locational and/or definitive signature emanating from the same. The formations (presence signature) are important in determining the location and movements of a fugitive. The epicentre of the presence signature is ultimately the location of the fugitive. The epicentre is

dynamic in nature. There are micro-level and macro-level elements of a fugitive's presence signature. In the case of fugitive deploying robust military style security, once the epicentre has been located, it is the preserve of special-operations forces to isolate it, from the rest of the presence signature.

When isolation of the epicentre is achieved, the next action is neutralisation of the epicentre. Upon achieving this objective, the rest of the presence signature can be targeted for neutralisation, prevented from mounting a rescue attempt to save the epicentre from interdiction or dealt with it simultaneously together with the epicentre. The aerial forces with the duty of neutralising the epicentre, should also be to protect the ground forces involved in maintaining 'eyeball'/optical contact with the fugitive.

The primary concern of the Allied Forces in the operations in Afghanistan, was the speedy ascertaining of the whereabouts of fugitive al-Qaida leaders, and most importantly, Bin Laden. It was certain from the intelligence of the Northern Alliance and Defence Intelligence Agency, that bin Laden was not in their area of operation, but they hoped that someone knew where he had been in the last few days – i.e. they hoped that it would be a Human Intelligence Reservoir. The Allies assumed that someone who was in their area of operation had been in contact with bin Laden either immediately, before or during the fall of the City of Mazar-e-Sharif . But their method of seeking out the elusive contact was by way of the most inefficient method given the circumstances, given the nature of the Human Intelligence Reservoirs – DIRECT OVERT QUESTIONING.

Another operational mistake that occurred was that due to the reliance on human intelligence assets of questionable loyalties, who were not trained or equipped to operate in a volatile epicentre under attack from the Allies. When the epicentre was located in Kabul around 11 November 2001, an eastern corridor ostensibly created to allow for the safe exit of human intelligence assets also enabled the epicentre to move away from Kabul, and to seek refuge in Pakistan.

Locating and tracking the epicentre with a level of real-time measured accuracy, means that operations can be undertaken without risking the lives of human intelligence assets in the epicentre, by use of precision interdiction systems and well trained personnel.

Powers (2002), reviews the technical opinions of Gunaratna Rohan, an academic expert on terrorism, that al-Qaeda's brand of terror is likely to end with the interdiction of bin Laden – meaning that he should have been the initial soul focus of the operation in Afghanistan in 2001 when anger and excitement probably served as an operational diversion.

Permitting of non-controlled transport in and out of the epicentre, is also a key factor that should be inhibited, but this was not the case in Afghanistan. There were unidentified airlifts from an airfield in Kunduz on November 23, 2001 while the City was under siege by the Allied Forces and the Northern Alliance. These airlifts probably obtained Allied consent.

The epicentre's effort to conceal its signatures of existence, is illustrated by the contention of the National Security Agency and United States Special Forces', when they

clarify that bin Laden makes satellite phones via relay, making it very difficult to locate him. It is also demonstrated that when confronting a quasi-military criminal organisation, in order to access and interdict the epicentre, there must be targeted Violence of Action and unrelenting response to any security or opposition from the epicentre. This must be continuous until the epicentre is accessed and contained. If the epicentre gets away, it is inoculated from the methodology of the forces pursuing it, and will be more difficult to act against it in the future. An example of concealment, diversion and deception is demonstrated by the escaped of Mullah Omar from Kandhar, disguised as a common man, while travelled on a motor cycle.

The organised nature of the resistance that the Northern Alliance and Western Forces encountered in Afghanistan, was an indication of a massive effort, probably organised by the members of a conventional armed force, from at least one third party sovereign state. It is overwhelmingly probable, that this sovereign state still (un)wittingly offers the Al Qaida and Taliban leadership, military support and leadership sanctuary. This systematic resistance was demonstrated by:

1. the rudimentary air force the Taliban developed prior to September 11, 2001 that was vital in suppressing their Northern Alliance rivals.
2. The deployment of well equipped conventional battlefield formations, that could only be ousted, by way of utilising more advanced Allied Forces.

At this point, it is important to note that though there are no specific ways of measuring the efficacy of a search or interdiction mission team, the use of parallel efforts

(search teams and strategists completely unknown to each other) provides an evaluation mechanism on a case to case basis. Parallel efforts, are a major application by Sudoplatov(1995) in a number of cases. They also act as a fail safe mechanism should one search team be neutralised or incapacitated, the Center that is controlling the search for the fugitive epicentre, can simply feed information obtained by one search party to an optional search party.

3.6 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 6

Fugitive: Winston Churchill

Biodata: born 1874 – died 1965, Gender – male, Prisoner of War

Case Status: Escaped successfully from internment

Case details:

Churchill (1972) explores the details of his earlier life in South Africa, as a soldier and adventurer. He was involved in a reconnaissance mission aboard an armoured train out of Estcourt, in South Africa. The train was intercepted and as a result of a spirited struggle, the engine of the train got away but Churchill was captured by General Botha in Natal in November 15, 1899. As he was not in full military uniform, his leadership role in enabling the engine of the armoured train to escape was considered a criminal act but he was not sentenced to death and was instead confined to indefinite custody.

Churchill postulated that : ‘a captive both subconsciously and deliberately seeks out defects in the system used to keep him/her in custody – thereby providing an opportunity for

effecting an escape'. Churchill further states that, 'the history of war and crime contains many unexpected and audacious attempts'. Sir Winston Churchill escaped from captivity on December 12, 1899, and was for a short while thereafter the most wanted fugitive in South Africa.

A few hours after leaving the detention camp and during which his escape had not become a matter of public knowledge, he simply wore a hat and walked in the streets of Pretoria to an area where he could sit and contemplate. His main problems were lack of food, money, navigation aids, medicine and continued evasion of his pursuers, once his escape had become a matter of public record.

The failure of the Protection forces in Pretoria to challenge him meant that they saw what happened, but as in many other cases in history had not realised what had happened. Challenging any person at random, regardless of their rank, must therefore be a valuable counter-measure. This further evidenced by von Konrat (1977)⁷, in his short military career, as he would always challenge any person even of superior rank, if they were not sure of his credentials.

Churchill avoided the very tempting desire to run in order to get away; something that he probably assumed would draw attention of others to himself in an urban area. It is safe to assume that either the night concealed Churchill well enough, or his clothes were appropriate i.e. emanating no signature to warrant a challenge from security or suspicion of the general

⁷ This publication is listed in the bibliography for Chapter 1

public. His main available navigation aids were astronomical in type : the sun by day and the stars by night.

His next course of action, was to seek a transport route out of Pretoria – he chose the railway line, and he travelled along it making an appropriate detour, whenever he came about security guarding it. It is worth noting that those escaping via known transport routes, can only succeed if they can evade the security guarding such a route. Finally he took advantage of a train moving along the railway line as a mode of transport without due consent. His choice of transport meant that he was not subject to any search at that point, as the train was not on a noted schedule for suspicious human transport.

Churchill's decision to find a fast moving mode of transport was due to the fact that he wanted to cut down the problem of lack of provisions for his survival. Though it is not stated in the publication, it is clear that training, experience, psychology and level of education, are decisive factors in the survival, escape, resistance and evasion choices, an individual makes. This means that having a good grasp of one's background, is the key to anticipating his/her actions and reactions, while such persons are fugitives, enabling one to set up a viable trap/ambush or search pattern. It is also clear that Churchill chose to change his time of transport, as he gained knowledge of its direction, while moving only at night in order to minimise the chances of detection by way of natural means. Though Churchill at times followed the railway line on foot, he kept an eye for any parameter emanating from the security along the line e.g. campfires, dwelling, etc. This means that fielded forces did not make much of an effort in concealment as they were not in the front lines. Their lack of

concealment, facilitated the fugitive's survival and evasion tradecrafts. He also endeavoured to avoid completely, any area, preferred by security forces, from his immediate past experience as he travelled.

One's background is a pre-fugitive state emanating parameter, especially in cases of prisoners where escape is a full time preoccupation. A detailed background report of an individual or searching for and finding such information is likely to aid the capture of a fugitive.

Immediate background information that may be sought about fugitive, include: means of nutrition, state of physical fitness, psychology, potential areas of supportive persons or populations, means of transport and route options. Life time background information that may be sought about a fugitive, include: education, affiliations, religion, experience.

It can be assessed from Churchill's escape that he had great emotional resistance, to pain, suffering, starvation and other forms of abstinence, which minimised his need for interaction with the local population, further aiding his chances for a successful escape. Emotional strength is further evidenced by Churchill's religious beliefs, aiding him to look forward to better times and liberty ahead. He does not attribute his well being to his own intelligent decisions, local population, but to a High Power. This is due to the fact that all said and done, Churchill could have made the wrong decisions, simply leading to his death or recapture, but did not do so against all odds.

Knowing which kind of monetary currency and/or valuables are at the disposal of a fugitive, are vital in assisting in locating a person by way of their likely to be idiosyncratic expenditure patterns.

From Churchill's experience, it is clear that a person with skills in identifying friendly or sympathetic persons in populations has a better chance of escaping from hostile elements and remaining safe in widely hostile territory. A fugitive is nevertheless more likely to seek help from those who seem to manifest even the remotest trait or his social or political affiliations – while at the same time members of a household (not necessarily members of the same immediate family) could be split on the decision of supporting a fugitive or the likelihood of ever doing so.

Though the Boer government had got a good intelligence estimate of the areas where Churchill would transit through as a fugitive, they did not succeed in apprehending him because:

- their spies on the ground, e.g. the maids in the household that gave him refuge, were not thorough in following up all their concerns.
- Cultural ties proved stronger than citizenship and made it impossible for his hosts to hand him over to the authorities
- Probably due to the complexity of the task, the government did not draw up a fairly detailed profile of the households that may support him, and put them under full time surveillance.

- There were no impromptu and thorough inspections, of both goods and transport vehicles - *search discretion* was not sufficiently exercised by the Security Forces.

The print media, had a precise intelligence estimate of the exact route that Churchill would follow to freedom, all the options left to him, the immediate risks that he faced and his precise method and direction of movement, e.g. they were able to guess that he would pass through Komati Poort and Waterval Boven Stations five days before he actually did so. It can therefore be assumed that the news media is an intelligence organisation whose desire to disclose its secrets by necessity of informing the public and the essence of its very existence, denies it the satisfaction and benefits of knowing and contemplating in secrecy.

Churchill's assessment of his experience was that: 'The risks of the battlefield, the hazards of the bullet or the shell are one thing. Having police after you is another. The need for concealment and deception breeds an actual sense of guilt very undermining to morale.'

On the matter of challenging members of the public at random, Churchill perceived that the questions that a fugitive feared most are:

- who are you?
- Where are you coming from?
- Where are you going to?

If verification is sought, a fugitive is more than always likely to contradict himself on these matters.

We also learn that even after a promising capture, the search for a fugitive is not terminated before confirmation of the identity of the person in custody. On the issue of passing through transit points such as road blocks, customs and immigration, it is a prerequisite, that in order for an escape of a fugitive to be a success once the case is well publicised, the members of his/her support network, have to be close by, facilitating passage at difficult nodes. Behaviour of persons at these points of transit, including friendly interaction with officials and security may be a notable sign.

3.7 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 7

Fugitive: Imaculée Ilibagiza

Biodata: Born 1970, Gender – female, Genocide Survivor

Case Status: Survived genocide and escaped from her tormentors

Case details:

NOTE OF CAUTION: Though Ilibagiza is not and was not a criminal fugitive in the eyes of the world, the operatives of the government regime, that sought her extermination, viewed her as a person unworthy of living, for their own reasons however unjustified. It is more than probable that many a criminal fugitive use her methods, that is why they are studied in this dissertation.

Criminal fugitives face the same psychological and physical challenges in hiding especially in an environment of hostility and chaos that affords one little or no opportunity for flight from his/her pursuers. At the same time such fugitives are further disadvantage by lack of resources for safety, protection, survival and mobility. From the

perspective of law enforcement, at times the people that they seek to capture are close by to the search parties that seek to capture them, but due to the fugitives patience, perseverance, endurance and skilfulness, plus reliable support networks, they are made to seem remotely hidden, out reach and seemingly impossible to find.

Analysing the search for Ilibagiza, which so fortunately failed to succeed and successful searches for other fugitives, which deploy the same techniques without success due to their unreliable support networks, we are able to deduce a factor that goes into the reducing the efficacy of a search, this being lack of thoroughness in geometric grid exploitation at all levels, due to impatience, excitement, intoxication, lack of resources and inexperience of the search party in question. Not to be forgotten is the unavailability of a first hand source to provide real time information on a voluntarily basis during a search, such practice would further enhance efficacy of a search.

A concept that comes into play in fugitive psychology, is that at times a fugitive perceives with good reason, that the pursuers seeking his/her interdiction have a baseless vendetta, not just in their enterprise of pursuit and have also been misled into being incapable of fully and fairly comprehending his/her predicament.

From Ilibagiza's experience, we learn that cases in which conscience, belief, ethnicity or birthright, lead to one being a fugitive, there are little or no chances of a fugitive voluntarily turning him or herself in to law enforcement.

After many years of ethnic tensions and administrative intrigue, climaxed by a subverted attempt to reach peace, the genocide began on the morning of April 7, 1994. By virtue of ethnic background every Tutsi came to be a target for extermination by state machinery and citizenry mainly of the Hutu ethnic group. A few Tutsi survived and lived as criminal fugitives, as their fellow citizens including the moderated Hutu who sheltered them were hunted down for sport. Systematic death lists were drawn up through out the country and free movement was forbidden, in order to facilitate the genocide.

In a situation of such chaos, most people rightly or wrongly, as Ilibagiza's family did, place themselves under 'house arrest' and move only out of their homes for food and/or essential services. Events that follow thereafter may mirror, the following scenario:

1. Before one becomes a fugitive, he/she attempts to make a stand against the accusing authority. Only on noticing that such a stand is futile or dangerous, does one resolve to the act of going into hiding.
2. The next stage of one becoming a fugitive is their finding of reliable support networks and these can only be people who:
 - a. have known the potential fugitive in the past.
 - b. Share the same persuasion with potential fugitive and are not likely to betray him/her
 - c. Do not know the potential fugitives background and have no idea that there is a search for the fugitive.
3. The next stage towards a fugitive status, would for one to go to immediate isolation or

to a different location (in which he or she is unlikely to be known altogether). If immediate isolation is not attainable, people tend to seek out friends and acquaintances who are willing to establish a support network and change their identities

4. Upon going into hiding, the change of one's identity and development of new background stories become a priority for the fugitive so as to survive by obtaining essential services from the public while at the same time foiling any attempt at identification by one's pursuers. In extreme cases a fugitive takes advanced proactive counter-measures, e.g. by killing to evade capture.
5. Once in hiding of a confined type, a fugitive has the need for information in addition to all other necessities of day-to-day life. Information is obtained with assistance from his/her support network. If the information getting into the public record seems to be leading towards interdiction of the fugitive, his/her support network launch a disinformation campaign or change locations of hiding.
6. Like Churchill, Ilibagiza surrendered her fate and well being to a Higher Power. She does not attribute her survival or safety to her own wit, desires, knowledge and effort. Fugitives actively and subconsciously seek to detect the fatigue of the support network, which is a survival risk, and if necessary escape to a new location or support network.
7. From Ilibagiza's experience we learn that people search or put specific locations under surveillance, for fugitives because:

- they believe that the residents are sympathetic to the fugitive.
- The consumption patterns of the location do not tally with external visual surveillance.
- The fugitives have been sighted at that location.
- Blanket searches have been mandated.
- The residents of those houses are perceived to be deceptive.
- There is no alternative refuge for the fugitive in the vicinity.
- Known affiliations of the residents in the house to the fugitive.

8. As in the case of Churchill during the Anglo - Boer war in South Africa, when he was a fugitive and Ilibagiza's description of many situations, the greater threat to the well being and safety of a fugitive hiding in a house is the non-fugitives living in that house or location. This is especially true if there are differences in socio-political persuasions.

9. When checking a house, ceilings, behind furniture, secret chambers, direction of wiring and plumbing and holes nearby should be searched for. Dogs and Ultra-wide band visors come in handy, when searching for fugitives in houses.

3.8 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 8

Fugitive: Roman Shukheyevich

Biodata: Cold war period, Gender – male, clandestine operative, Ukrainian Nationalist

Case Status: Interdicted by Sudoplatov

Case details:

In November 1949 Ukrainian pamphleteer Yaroslav Galan was assassinated in his apartment in Lvov. The prime suspect in his murder was Roman Shukheyevich, who was leading some Ukrainian nationalist movement against communism – Sudoplatov was ordered by the Soviet authorities to interdict Shukheyevich.

Shukheyevich's case proved difficult to close, mainly because of his past background in the German SS and Abwehr – he proved to be a formidable clandestine operative. The manhunt against for him, was mainly around the city of Lvov – the value for searching in this area was reinforced by wreath he sent to a funeral, his participation in social life in Lvov, and sighting of his bodyguards in the area, by informers.

Shukheyevich relied too much on his World War II connections. In their quest to have a support network, fugitives find it difficult or impossible to reinvent themselves to the extent that they cannot make a clean cut away from their past lives and relationships, especially if they are fighting for a political objective. It was with this knowledge that Sudoplatov facilitated the release of a relative of a member of Shukheyevich's support network, from prison in exchange for information on potential hiding places and identity of a courier of Shukheyevich.

In the process of inspecting one of these hiding places, Shukheyevich panicked and shot a militia man, though he was not captured at this juncture, Sudoplatov believes that had he not shot the militia man, his presence at that location, could have never been established in the first place. This shooting led to the establishment of an affiliation of Shukheyevich to a lady Daria Gussyak, who served as his bodyguard.

Posing as a local civil servant, Sudoplatov asked Daria's niece of her recent whereabouts and got a positive answer – that she was living in a dormitory of a medical institute that she attended. Daria was put under visual (eye ball) surveillance, and her frequent and long stays at a co-operative general store, led to the assumption that Shukheyevich was hiding at that location. It is worth noting that though in this instance Sudoplatov utilised DIRECT OVERT QUESTIONING, he also deployed DECEPTION, in that the subject of questioning, Daria's niece, did not know his actual identity or intentions.

Daria shot at surveillance officer, who tried to make an acquaintance with her, she was put under isolation, and misinformation was spread out that she had been killed, in order to prevent Shukheyevich from changing his location. Shortly afterwards, all the routes to and from the store were blocked and Shukheyevich was interdicted, as he attempted to escape from the store in a shoot out.

Shukheyevich's interdiction, was a master-piece of human intelligence tradecrafts, no mention of high-tech gadgets or extravagant methods as read from the text of Sudoplatov(1995), and can be replicated with adjustments to fit many other operational environments.

3.9 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 9

Fugitive: Doug Hartman

Biodata: Gender – male, Fraudster

Case Status: Interdicted several times, then reformed

Case details:

We observe from Hartman (1995), that the enforcement powers assigned to an officer on the ground, are critical if a fugitive is to be brought to book. The extent of law enforcement powers, revolve around questions such as:

- a. who can they stop and search?
- b. Which locations can they enter and search?
- c. What records and information are available to the searchers during the search?
- d. Can the searchers intervene into the functioning of transport and communication systems, during the search?
- e. Are they able to effect an arrest given the best resistance by a fugitive?
- f. When can they carry out an operation as determined by their own discretion?

An interesting observation, is that fugitives, (un)wittingly return to the scene of crime:

- That may be for purposes of an assessment or it may be near their residence, transport route, workplace, etc

Hartman's experience illustrates that, someone who depends on crime for livelihood, and thereafter takes part in a crime that results in his or her flight, is likely to be a recidivist, who will repeat the same if he or she is not put through a correctional process, as flight and benefit from proceeds of crime, causes a sensation of excitement, invincibility and satisfaction.

The recidivist nature of a criminal fugitive, is consistent with Hartman's career which was dependent on the proceeds from crime. We learn from studying his childhood, that his memories are mainly those related to entertainment, games and sports - there is little indication that Hartman considered academics as a way of making a break in life and succeeding. At the same time the review of his military career shows that:

- evasion and concealment are necessary factors for survival at times of trouble.
- Continuous practice results in perfection.
- Gambling is a way of passing ones time and escaping from boredom.
- His ability to make easy money in post war Europe, especially in the Berlin black market and enjoyment of this 'easy' money could not be sustained legally by his skill set upon discharge from the military.

The Searchers' Memory is an important factor, that determines for how long one remains a fugitive. The searchers' / pursuers' memory can be divided into about three categories:

- a. personal /individual
- b. group
- c. institutional

Memory can be detailed as follows:

- a. remembering of a fugitive's key characteristics.
- b. Recognising a fugitive by way of specifically identifying him, by way of key characteristics.
- c. Recognising, gathering and safely storing the evidence, that could link a fugitive to a crime.

In the case of a recidivist fugitive who does not change his/her geographical area of operations due to familiarity with legal and operating systems, there is always the distinct possibility of meeting and interacting with his/her victim, without noticing, as such a fugitive tends to live in the same social strata as his/her victims. This is evidenced by Hartman's encounters with his victims, in the City he choose for most of his operations – London.

And on the news media, we see that the escape from Chelmsford Prison, by Alfie Hinds, is a vindication of my perception og the news media as being in possession of intelligence of an accurate nature, which is never believed due to its public nature and easy

availability. Hinds betrayed the confidences of Hartman's aiding his escape to the media, without alteration.

3.10 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 10

Fugitive: Raila Amollo Odinga

Biodata: Born: 1945, Gender – male, Politician

Case Status: Kenya's Prime Minister(2008 - ...)

Case details:

Badejo (2006), in Chapter 11, has a feature entitled 'Raila's Turn to go into Exile'.

NOTE OF CAUTION: The Right Honourable Raila Odinga (Kenya's Prime Minister 2008 - ...) fled Kenya in October, 1991 to go into exile. Friends and family pressurised him to go into exile due to the political situation that was prevailing in Kenya, at that particular time.

His decision to go underground, then into exile was prompted by various forms of harassment and threats which at the time, were attributed to the ruling regime in Kenya. There had been a culture of political violence in the Republic of Kenya which had resulted in assassination of several prominent political figures, such as Robert Ouko, Tom Mboya and Jesse Kariuki.

When Raila noticed that he was under police surveillance, ostensibly because of his political persuasions, he began to become more cautious at times deploying various counter-surveillance measures. The threshold of no return, was when he was requested to

report to the Kenya Police on October 3, 1991. Upon reporting to the Central Police Station, all officers present denied any knowledge of any such request. This psychological warfare ploy was no ordinary event given the nature of a police summons in the Republic of Kenya, the event was itself reportable to the police, and should have been duly noted and investigated.

In the 1980s and 90s, Kenya had a repressive political regime, hell-bent on silencing all forms of opposition. On October 4, there was a failed attempt to arrest Raila at his residence and thereafter he continued to receive threatening phone calls, which were made mainly to his wife and children. In that dark chapter in Kenya's history, political opponents in the unofficial opposition, were considered criminals and marked for detention without trial, assassination, and other forms of harassment. Torture and other human rights abuses at the hands of the authorities was common place.

Upon further incidences of harassment, Raila took the advice of a United States of America Embassy official in Nairobi, Alan Eastham whose perception was that there was the potential of physical harm being inflicted upon Raila, advice that the politician took seriously and decided to flee from the country. But due to the strained diplomatic relationship between Kenya and the United States of America governments, Raila was left to his own devices, when it came to developing a viable escape strategy.

Thereafter, Raila began to reside in the homes of his friends, but he chose not to reside with those friends who were known to be affiliated with him as a matter of public

record. He stayed at first at the residence of Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi. While at the residence of Kituyi, only the immediate family of his hosts knew of his presence. When they left for work, only Raila would remain alone in the house. At the same time, the Kenya Police continued the futile search for Raila, at his known physical address.

After some while, Raila and his advisors, decided that he should use an option deployed earlier by another Kenyan dissident – Dr. Gibson Kamau Kuria: this entailed Raila going to the United States of America Embassy without prior warning. He had secured the assistance of a medical practitioner in disguising his face and then set off for the United States of America Embassy. In his convoy was a chase car, in case things went wrong. But upon reaching the Embassy and meeting with diplomats, instead of giving Raila a means of escape, they contacted his rival President Moi who gave his assurances, which did not satisfy Raila. This decision to contact President Moi, as to the status of Raila, was a miscalculation on the part of Embassy officials, as it would have made them subjects of surveillance.

Upon failing to get the assistance that he had sought from the Embassy, he left and went unannounced to the residence of a friend, Dr. Anyang Nyong'o who was surprised to meet Raila there, upon his return from work. Next, he made his way to the residence of another friend (Gordon Jalang'o Anyango) and stayed there for a week. From the tradecrafts perspective, Raila's interactions with his support network, demonstrated his mastery of the tradecrafts, the case of his interaction with Dr. Nyong'o after he left the United States Embassy, is a clear illustration of this point. Even if his host was to be

arrested and interrogated, before he reached his home, he would rightfully deny knowing anything about his whereabouts. An attempt to communicate with his host in advance, would also have been subjected to the likelihood of communications interception.

Odinga then made a statement from hiding expressing fears for his life. The Catholic Secretariat including Archbishop Okoth, gave him a sympathetic ear and arranged for the evacuation of Raila from Nairobi. Before this occurred the politician had again changed residences in Nairobi to that of his sister-in-law, Clarice Auma Oyoo. This gave Raila an opportunity to meet his immediate family, before he went into exile. The failure of the Kenya Police to capture Raila at this juncture, is clear evidence of their sloppy and shoddy work in this particular case. They did not put his immediate family, which constitutes his immediate support network, under surveillance yet they claimed that he was a criminal and the whereabouts of his family was a matter of public knowledge.

Raila, left Nairobi with Catholic clergy in a car, disguised as one of them. Like Doug Hartman (the ‘King of Conmen’) he read a newspaper to cover his face, whenever he passed near Police Force road block; this is another clear evidence of escape and evasion tradecrafts. The Catholic church then moved him around residences in Nyanza Province of Kenya, before taking him to meet his father in the town of Bondo and again it is clear, that they did not put Raila’s immediate support network, under surveillance when. While at his father’s residence, he stayed indoors until, his father had the opportunity of meeting him.

An escape was organised via boat, on Lake Victoria. This particular boat departed late in the afternoon, and was navigated well at night using astronomical navigation techniques. As a precaution, there were two people on board the boat, who had experience in navigating Lake Victoria. Raila's support network, had various specialisations, according to Badejo (2006) he only sought out assistance of components of his support network, as and when required. There is no evidence in the text of Raila abusing the hospitality of his support network.

At a stopping point named Sigulu Island on Lake Victoria, and his host the boat owner Hezron Orori, organised to get Raila and identity card and a fake tax record. At this point we see the importance of biometric cards which can be verified from mobile computer terminals, in impeding the swift movement of fugitives. It is also clear, at this point, that if a person with fake identification papers is challenged and questioned on a few issues, indicated on his identification papers, chances are that if they are recently acquired a good cover story may not be forthcoming.

Identifying himself as 'Joseph Ojiwa Wadeya', Raila was able to get onto the Ugandan mainland and use public transport which was monitored by Police. Raila, then used the assistance of a friend (a former employee of his family business) – Shem Luanga, to remain underground – Shem in turn, put Raila in touch with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Country Representative Ahmed Sayyid Farah, who then informed the Ugandan government. Unknown to Raila, the Ugandan government informed the Kenyan government of his presence in Uganda.

He remained underground in Uganda, in order to evade capture by Kenyan security agents. He remained at Farah's residence while the UNHCR searched for a country, which could host Raila. Norway a country that had broken off diplomatic ties with Kenya, made an offer to host Raila. Norway was also suitable for Raila, as his sisters Ruth Adhiambo Odinga and Caroline Odinga were studying in that country, and his sister Wenwa Odinga, had previously acquired her Ph D in Norway. From this we can make the observation, that fugitives go to places where they are likely to find a support networks in existence or they are invited by the same. Rarely would a fugitive, resort to seeking long-term assistance from unknowns as Churchill did during his flight from South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War. 10 out of 12 of the case studies in this dissertation, have got illustrations, of support networks and their management. These show that they are persons known to the fugitive, before there was a manhunt against him/her.

In Kampala, a well placed friend of Raila, Dr. Steve Chebrot – the Ugandan Minister for Local Government, made arrangements for his departure to Norway. To get to Entebbe airport from Kampala, Raila had again to be disguised, and given a fake identity card in the name of Haji Omar.

Like Doug Hartman's return to the City Centre of Manchester, as he fled from the police and was forced to pass by the police patrol cars and personnel at the bank he had attempted to defraud, there was no direct flight from Entebbe to Europe. Raila's flight

and to get to Europe via Nairobi (the city in which the Kenya Police had attempted to arrest him previously and where he was still very much a wanted man). This recurrent point in a fugitive’s flight can be termed as the *intra search space point of involuntary transitory convergence of a fugitive*.

3.11 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 11

Fugitive: Anne Frank

Biodata: Teenager, Gender – female, Author, Girl child

Case Status: Interdicted

Case details:

NOTE OF CAUTION: Anne Franks was born on 12 June 1929, she died while imprisoned at Bergen – Belsen Concentration camp, just before it was liberated – she was not a criminal fugitive in the sense that the common criminal is today construed but was a victim of genocide against the Jews. Like Ilibagiza in Rwanda, we find that Anne Frank in Holland, had the problem of her ethnic / religious group, being criminalised (from the perspective of a forensic criminology, criminalisation is not always applied by the power that be, for the greater good of the society. Criminalisation may simply be a conduit for the pursuit of a pre-existing vendetta against certain persons. Nevertheless, as a criminal fugitive, even a falsely accused person, uses methods of evasion and concealment, that are similar regardless of the form of indictment. The key difference between the Ms. Frank and Ms. Ilibagiza, is that unlike the latter, the Franks were captured though they lived in a more comfortable hideaway. The increased comfort level of the Frank family hideaway, may have something to do, with their eventual capture. Anne Frank’s story is therefore analysed to determine, how she and

her family managed to stay underground and how they were probably located by the Dutch Security Police and the Nazi SS (SS is translated to mean Storm Troopers).

Anne and her family, were arrested between 10am – 10:30am on 4th August, 1944, by SS Sergeant Karl Josef Silberbauer and members of the Dutch Security Police. It is the opinion of a witness of the event that someone must have tipped them off. Upon the arrest of the Frank family, Anne's diaries were strewn on the floor, only to be retrieved and by their family's employees and handed over to her father, after the war. From this event, the very first lesson that we learn is that the proper exploitation of evidence at the location of a hideaway is necessary if the whole support network of a fugitive is to be identified. Fortunately in this case, there was no proper site exploitation, probably because the Nazi SS and Dutch Security Police, were excited by the results of their tip off and the following operation. Had they found the Franks through their own detective work, it is overwhelmingly probable, that they would have taken interest in the diaries, and would not have left them on the floor.

Unlike Ilibagiza, who managed to remain in hiding for a shorter period of just about three months, before it became too dangerous for her to live in her hideaway, the Frank family remained in hiding for about 2 years they were eventually detected and interdicted. The Frank family could have gotten away, but on close scrutiny of the diaries of Anne Frank it becomes clear, that they made several mistakes. It is however impossible to determine from the information available today, whether these mistakes led to the interdiction of the Frank family and their associates. Anne Frank's diary documents her life, from 12th June

1942 to 1st August, 1944. For her Jewish family, the threshold of becoming fugitives, was crossed on 5th July, 1942 , when upon her sister Margot getting a call up to join the Nazi SS.

Some of the decrees that made overt life impossible for the Jews, at the time in Holland, included but were not limited to rules, such as:

- Jews were required to wear a yellow star.
- Jews were required to turn in their bicycles. From Green(2008) we learn that when all forms of communication are denied, bicycles become one of the ways through which information can be disseminated fast against an attacker of a community, hence under similar circumstances insurgents have undertaken to deny persons the ability to use bicycles in Northern Uganda, in a bid to hamper the government counter-insurgency effort.
- Jews were forbidden to use trams.
- Jews were forbidden to ride in cars.
- Jews were required to do their shopping between 3pm and 5pm.
- Jews were required to frequent only Jewish barber and beauty salons.
- Jews were forbidden to go out to theatres, cinemas or other forms of entertainment.
- Jews were forbidden from sports fields.
- Jews were forbidden to sit in gardens after 8pm.
- Jews were forbidden to visit Christian homes.

It was simply a crime to be a Jew, and there were many other restrictions, not listed above, that were imposed on Jews, to make them more vulnerable for extermination in future, by way of killings at concentration camps.

From her diary entry on 24th June, 1942, Anne discloses that her mother and father, gave their bicycles to Christian friends for safekeeping, as a result of the restrictions, that were imposed on Jews. After crossing the threshold to become a fugitive, this is an action, that is undertaken in the hope for a brighter future, under different circumstances. It is an acknowledgement that in hiding, one is at least partially dependent on the good will of other persons who have been known to him or her in the past.

In the diary entry of 5th July, 1942 – Anne mentions that her father lost his job after which he started talking of the family going underground. There was sufficient proof in the public domain by way of public record and other accounts, that Jews were being exterminated. The Franks were therefore under no illusion as to what the future held for them if they did not go into hiding. For more than 1 year the Frank family had been stocking up on provisions and sending their movable assets to friends for safe keeping.

Apparently, this seemed to be the perfect strategy for persons seeking to go into hiding, but an obvious downside to this, is that if one intends to be a fugitive those keeping his/her assets may develop a covetous desire for the same. This desire may be satisfied by betraying the fugitive in order to have the owner taken into captivity or killed, while he or she remains the new and unchallenged ‘owner’ of those assets.

Her entry for 9th July 1942 demonstrates that when a state criminalises an ethnic / religious group, people do not want to be seen in public undertaking any effort that may be construed as providing the banned community with support or assistance, however sympathetic they may be to the plight and / or suffering of members of that group. The Frank family, had passed the threshold of going into hiding, many months before, because they were able to read into the future implications of the Nazi regime's treatment of Jews. Their chosen hiding place, was their father's office place – only a handful of his employees knew of the plan. As reflected in the text of Ilibagiza & Erwin (2007), all too often, not all the members in a household, may be aware of the presence of a fugitive, within the same household; more so if they are of different socio-political persuasions.

At this point a psychological condition, that leads to a fugitive hiding not far away from his/her last known physical address, if not within the same address, is explored. For all intents and purposes, let us call this psychological condition – ***THE PERFECTLY POLICED SEARCH SPACE SYNDROME***, we can go on further and describe it. When someone becomes a fugitive, he/she is most likely to draw onto past relations and experience, for survival and evasion. The perception that makes one to take to such behaviour include:

1. friends/acquaintances are reliable under all circumstances (or there are no better alternatives), and are unlikely to have any questionable contacts with the seemingly omnipresent law enforcement establishment.
2. Borders are perfectly policed physical barriers – even if that is not always the case, the education systems, would have burnt this into the minds of many citizens

3. Even if the fugitive could get away from a hostile territory, due to its largely amorphous security or combatant presence since an individual or group of persons, do not have real time tactical information that would facilitate safe and secure movement. Their perception of entrapment prevails as common sense to them, ensuring that they do not opt for a change in hideaway location.
4. A fugitive assumes that somehow things will get better as he/she has not directly been confronted by the highly reputed search party. This hope is further strengthened by ones desires to avoid the unknown e.g. new ways of livelihood and unfamiliar surroundings in exile.
5. There is a sense of security and safety, derived from remaining together as a family or friends, and caring for each other. The fact that breaking up the group and attempting an individual survival, concealment and evasion strategy, could increase opportunities for continued freedom of individuals of the initial joint group – common destiny seems more important than individual survival.
6. The case of surrendering to law enforcement, may be seen as more attractive, than the difficulties and dangers faced in a clandestine lifestyle.
7. The state and its operatives seem incapable of devious conduct, improper motive or illegal undertaking, against individuals – a perspective that has been proven wrong, time and time again in history.

All these symptoms or factors do not have to manifest themselves simultaneously in a fugitive, but at least one of these factors is likely to overwhelmingly, manifest itself to the

extent that it impairs, the survival instincts of the individual(s) in question, as a fugitive in a safe and secure existence.

The entry of 11th July, 1942, has Anne expressing her concern for letting out any noise, that might attract the attention of their neighbourhood. An audio signature from a fugitive hiding in a building can today be captured by a wide range of detectors. The content, voice or timing of speech or the production of any other form of noise emanating from a fugitive's hiding place are targeted by search parties, while a fugitive consciously attempts to minimise the same.

Otto Frank's frequently listening to 'England'(presumably BBC radio on the wireless) was a way of keeping informed at a macroscopic level – but it does not give him sufficient data in the way of tactical information, that would allow for him to plot an escape from the search space, which is Nazi Controlled Europe in this case.

Like in the case of Ilibagiza's hiding place, the door to the 'Secret Annexe' in which the Frank family was hiding was concealed by the use of furniture – a book case. In a specialisation such as that of searching for fugitives in our midst, and with ever more ingenious methods applied by fugitives, to obtain successes at escapes, survival and evasion; getting to analyse past case studies is critical, as there is rarely a place for undertaking training, that will help one to cope with the crafty nature of a criminal fugitive.

If the search space is the *area of operations*, for a search party, then we can assume that any future anticipated search space can be defined as *AREA OF INTENTION*. An area of intention could be defined by way of treaties between sovereigns, covert action or simply the anticipated availability of more resources at the disposal of a search party. An area of intention may also be viewed from the perspective of a fugitive seeking to change, his/her theatre for concealment, survival and evasion.

In the text of Frank (2000), it is clear that a number of those hiding from the Nazis in Holland, had escaped from an area of operation of the Nazis – Germany, but they did not manage to escape from the area of intention of the Nazis, the wider European theatre that was to be invaded by the Nazis.

Austere living, rationing and self sacrifice, reduce the number of visits that members of a support network have to make to a hiding place and also conceals their procurement levels, by way of reduction of required stock. Even by September 1942, a notable item about the persons who went into hiding with the Franks family at the ‘Secret Annexe’, is that their consumption levels seemed to be normal – they were not starving or seemingly deprived in their hide out. This implies that if someone put their support network personnel under surveillance, he would notice consumption levels that are not supported by overt lifestyle of such a person. The diary entry of 14th October, 1942, has even got evidence of weight gain by Anne.

In various occasions, there was correspondence leaving the 'Secret Annexe'. An example, is that of Otto Frank to one of his sales men and another is correspondence distance learning courses that were taken up, by the Frank family in general. Distance learning raises questions, especially, when the course were to be returned for marking, justifying outstanding performance, would be an extra strain on the support network. This is more so if the distance learning institution, cannot positively identify and locate the purported students.

Another comparison to Ilibagiza's hiding place, that could be used in determining secret rooms in houses, is the tracing of electrical circuits and plumbing in a building. This could be incorporated into search patterns inside buildings.

The 29th October, 1942 entry shows us a critical difference between Ilibagiza and Anne. Unlike Ilibagiza who is deeply religious, Anne does not fully believe in a Higher Power. To her being Jewish has more to do with ethnicity, than religion. Her psychological mindset is one of time based hope, rather than faith based hope. As time is dynamic, so are her moods and her underlying motivations which can easily deteriorate with the changing environment.

There is clear evidence that the residents of the Secret Annexe, did not fully grasp the dire circumstances under which they were living, and did not make an extra effort to avoid verbal exchanges over the trivial disagreements that they faced. These frequent verbal exchanges could have led to their detection and capture, by the Nazi SS and their collaborators.

The diary entry of 17th November, 1942 is an example of a fugitive initiated disinformation campaign. They want to create the perception that they were residing in Belgium. This was to ensure that members of the public who had known of them, in the past did not focus on searching for them.

Another weakness in the secrecy of the Secret Annexe was the outgoing correspondence by Dussel, which were made out to several different people. Not being able to make a clean cut from the past and seeking to maintain unnecessary outside contacts and business, was a another factor that was likely to have led to the uncovering of the location of the Secret Annexe by Nazi Security apparatus. Dussel's misadventures are illustrated in the diary entry of 19th March, 1943. Dussel's correspondence from the Secret Annexe, was potentially valuable to any search party, as there are indications that it was facilitated by members of the support network of the Secret Annexe who were in turn communicating directly with Dussel's external contacts. With proper surveillance, assuming that Dussel's contacts were of dubious intent, locating him via observing the support network personnel, would be easy. Other transgressions of Dussel are indicated on the entry of 10th August, 1943, this clearly demonstrates again, that Dussel does not fully appreciate the gravity of the situation, for in addition to making non-essential correspondence with the outside world, he strains the support network by making it undertake to perform non-essential tasks, e.g. the procurement of banned literature which has no direct bearing to their survival as fugitives. The actual risk almost materialises, when Miep the bearer of the banned literature in question gets involved in a road accident with the Nazi SS, a situation that would have resulted in her

interrogation, in addition to a thorough search of her workplace and residence, that might have resulted in her indefinite incarceration or extermination.

From the perspective of a search party, it is difficult to take advantage of an abused support network, unless it is already under full time surveillance or an individual is found in possession of a suspicious article, due to a random search, based on the discretion of a search party.

The entry of 18th May 1943, indicates that despite the carelessness of the Secret Annexe residents in many respects, they would burn all their rubbish to avoid it being traced back to them.

Criminalisation of a race or faith, and the pursuant attempt to exterminate it is illustrated in the diary entry of 27th March, 1943. This entry has some very interesting comparisons to the attempt at the extermination of Tutsi's in Rwanda, in 1994. Anne narrates how she heard on the radio, a German comparing the Jews to cockroaches, who were to be cleared from Utrecht Province. This was a clear indication for the Jewish fugitives not to get out of hiding. There are many factors that a fugitive looks out for in order to determine, if it is safe to emerge, from hiding. Some of these potential safety indicators may be wrongly interpreted by a fugitive. On the other hand, when indicators are those of danger, the fugitive seeks to be more effective at hiding by way of concealment and evasion.

Like Ilibagiza, who faced the danger of being betrayed by members, who are workers of the household of her hideaway, the Franks had a worker in their business known as van Maaren, who despite his unreliability and curiosity, was not gotten rid of by way of termination of his employment. This is an indication that such persons would be effective in facilitating a manhunt for a fugitive if they are better instructed by way of mass media, on how to confirm the presence of fugitives in a household.

It is difficult to understand the psychological drive that led the Frank family into undertaking distance learning courses while they were in hiding. Like many fugitives, who get captured, it may be that they got their priorities wrong, in their determination for self improvement, for brighter days in the future, when they would no longer be fugitives. Not each and every bit of behaviour or decision, was made with the consideration for their own continued safety and underground status in mind – this is an assumption that a search-interdiction party makes in relation to any fugitive it seeks, as a starting point for operations. They had the feeling of being a step a head of their tormentors which may explain, how the Nazi SS located them, seemingly out of the blue. One mistake or the other, may have opened up the lines of possibilities for their pursuers.

When analysing the diary entry of 30th December, 1943, it is clear that when several fugitives decide to hide together, and they manage to attain a level of comfort and contentment amongst themselves – subgroups emerge. The domain of these subgroups deals with distribution of resources for the sustenance of its members as well as lifestyle quality management. The difference between the subgroups could be of a fundamental nature,

implying that all that keeps these subgroups in a common hideaway is lack of another hideaway and/or failure to get covert transport to another hideaway. An attempt by a fugitive to escape such an unpleasant situation in a hideaway, provides a wide range of opportunities, for his/her detection and interdiction. In my study of the Anne Frank case, the development of subgroups in the Secret Annexe, was probably due to the fact that there was no frequent, directed, clear and present danger posed to them, by search parties of the Dutch Security Police or Nazi SS.

From analysis of the entry of 1st March 1944, it is overwhelmingly probable, that an unauthorised person e.g. when a burglar attained covert entry into the building that house the Secret Annexe at 263 Prinsengracht, Amsterdam. Given the circumstances of the burglary, the intruder seems to have had access to an extra key and may have noticed that there were other persons residing in the office as residents in the after hours. At this point, the only logical counter-measure that the residents of the Secret Annexe would have employed to their advantage was to immediately move to another hiding place. This decision was however difficult to make as the residents were already divided into special-interest subgroups mainly along family lines. A deeper insight into the psychology of these fugitives, could be obtained from Anne Frank's sympathetic feelings for the plight of Hanneli, Sally and other Jews suffering in the Holocaust. She cannot immediately connect their plight to hers. But her subconscious mind is not at peace, hence the dreams she has, of the stormy clouds closing in on the residents of the Secret Annexe – it is notable that this is a description similar to that which psychic lady consulted by Ilibagiza's mother in Rwanda, described as the genocide that was to be in 1994.

In the real world, and by way of using legitimate means, a replication of Ilibagiza's and Anne's situation can be induced against wanted criminals by carrying out wide range of raids, against their support network and known hiding places. This would force the criminal fugitives to converge into joint-hiding, thereby giving them:

1. a slow ineffective and indecisive decision making mechanism.
2. Reduced propensity and options for mobility.
3. Greater likelihood of detection by way of their enhanced presence signature.

From analysis of the diary entry of 10th March 1944, it seems from the perspective of the reader that 263 Prinsengracht is under some kind of surveillance. The reasons for this conclusion, is that:

1. there is unexplained knocking of their wall which resulted in their silence, and possibly a method used for confirmation of their presence, in the building.
2. Mr. M, their supplier of potatoes, butter and jam, has been arrested.
3. By 14th March – the people who have been supplying them with food coupons have been arrested, which prevented the Secret Annexe residents from obtaining their fat and oil rations.
4. It is notable that on 11th April 1944, there was another major security incident at the hideaway. This time round, it is more than probable, that the occurrence was reported to the police; meaning that, those who intruded into the building housing the hideaway, together with the police, were

likely to have put the building under full time surveillance. But such was the indecisiveness of the fugitives who resided therein, that they did not urgently seek an alternative accommodation.

5. It is interesting to note from the entry of 8th May 1944, that Miep who was a member of the support network, was a consumer of alcohol. The chances that she would get intoxicated and reveal the existence of the Secret Annexe and its fugitives, was an open possibility, of which it is impossible to rule out, as to its probable materialisation.

3.12 - FUGITIVE CASE STUDY 12

Fugitive: Clyde Champion Barrow

Biodata: Gender – Male, Gangster

Case Status: Interdicted

Case details:

Clyde Champion Barrow and his companion Bonnie Parker, were shot to death by officers in an ambush in Louisiana, on May 23, 1934. It was one of the most challenging manhunts in the United States of America.

Clyde’s record of suspected crimes, included numerous killings, robberies and kidnappings. The geographical area of operations of the two partners in crime crossed state boundaries in the United States of America, thereby falling under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigations(FBI).

A medical prescription found in a car that Clyde had stolen and abandoned led FBI Special Agents to a drug store in Nacogdoches, Texas, where it was confirmed that the prescription had been filled by Clyde’s aunt (i.e. the FBI were able to identify part of his support networks and thereby establishing that the crime scene was part of Clyde’s presence signature.

Bonnie and Clyde aided the escape of Henry Methvin of Louisiana, from the Eastham State Prison Farm at Waddo, Texas. During the search for Bonnie and Clyde, posters containing their details were widely distributed and thereafter the FBI followed their

presence signature by way of evidence from the field and feedback from informers. This investigation resulted in the establishment of a link between Bonnie and Clyde, and another fugitive Henry Methvin. This placed their presence signature in Ruston, Louisiana. Further enquiries established that they had a party at Black Lake, Louisiana, on the night of May 21, 1934 and were due back two days later.

Police officers from Louisiana and Texas, set up a successful ambush along the highway near Sailes, Louisiana on May 23, 1934 and killed them.

**CHAPTER 4 – THE SECRET ADVANTAGE GAINED FROM EMBRACING
LESSONS LEARNT FROM INTELLIGENCE STUDIES PERTAINING TO CASE
STUDIES OF FUGITIVE EMANATING DEFINITIVE AND LOCATIONAL
PARAMETERS**

Each and every case study analysed in this dissertation, has idiosyncratic parameters and circumstances. In this chapter, we develop explore concepts of perspectives of security, both from the point of view of the fugitive and that of search-interdiction practitioners.

Ultimately the secret advantage held by a search party against a fugitive can only be obtained and upheld if there is a point of convergence; a focal point for all known intelligence on a specific fugitive. This focal point must be staffed by the requisite intellectual capital base which must in turn be able to take action, have unfaltering motivation and organisational efficiency. Focal points can be military organisations, law enforcement agencies and/or study/operations groups.

Convergence allows for the deployment of a wide range of intellectual capital skill pools which acquire/receive intelligence on fugitives and develop fairly enhanced profiles with almost accurate estimations as to the location of a fugitive and/or their idiosyncratic presence signatures. These Intelligence Studies, can only be useful in providing fugitive interdiction teams with secret operational advantages if their conclusions/findings remain secret, and more so to the fugitive.

An effective fugitive, will carry out research and assessment, as to the interdiction capabilities that are to be deployed against him/her and undertake to deploy the relevant counter-measures. In a world of multiple source co-ordinated threats, according to Snyder (2008) the object of security is shifting away from the state to the individual. This in turn implies that we ought to direct our focus on how individual can threaten a state (or ruling regime) or how the state can threaten security of individuals, mainly in the name of regime preservation and national security. There is no individual that better exemplifies that threat posed to a state, by a person and vice versa, than the individual who has got the status of criminal fugitive.

By adopting the perspective of realists, it is noted that, human conflicts will generally be resolved by way of superior application of power. Appeals to notions of justice, are assumed to be a sign of weakness, inability and indecisiveness. Similarly when dealing with the criminal fugitive, there ought to be a systematic and widely applicable methodology of structuring and executing a manhunt, which must be assumed to be a basic concept in today's world where some of the most heinous crimes are attributed to individual fugitive leaders. According to Snyder (2008), 'the realist world view sees much evil in human nature and finds recurrent patterns of tragedy in human existence', in short, fortunately or otherwise, history is bound to repeat itself, including the emergence of new criminal fugitives, who may apparently use the methods and approaches of past criminal fugitives.

Lynn-Jones (2008), offers an insight into the fertile field of criminal intrigue, that is human nature. It dictates that human nature has in it an innate lust for power, that drives

individuals and states to attempt to dominate others. What is more, there is also the obvious ambiguity, in the attempt to dominate, which may include the possible deployment of criminal and/or extraordinary means. While Mutimer (2008) goes further to define security studies as the study of threat, use and control of military force – in fugitive cases such as Joseph Kony and Osama bin Laden, there has been extensive use of military force in an attempt to bring about the conclusion of prolonged criminal fugitive search but unfortunately, whenever applied, the fielded military muscle and expertise did not have a clear tactical situation awareness of the challenge faced, resulting in escapes by these fugitives which in turn inoculates them from future efforts of search parties.

Mutimer (2008) goes further to quote Buzan, that ‘the relationship between states and individuals can be rather problematic. As such the security of individual is locked into an unbreakable paradox in which it is partly dependent on, and partly threatened by the state.’ Yet Mutimer does not go on to detail the specific and complex circumstances such as the complex nature of relationship between an individual and state that compels him/her to go underground and acquire a fugitive status.

From the new generation of Security Studies thinkers, the fugitive is viewed by the state as the threat, and the wider society is the referent object of which the state seeks to protect from the activities and influence of the fugitive by way of deploying counter-measures and undertaking decisive response against the fugitives activities or influence. Fugitives assume the state to be a threat and himself/herself to be the referent object, which needs to take measures to address threats. While the state from Mutimer’s perspective is

meant to be the container for security of its citizens, in many instances, the state is a threat to the security of its citizens rather than protector. This assumption remains true to the extent that the concept of *mala in se* or *mala in prohibita*, that is applied in determining potential criminal conduct may be warped or discriminative and to the extent that it penalises a person for reason that are entirely beyond his or her control.

Ideally the criminal fugitive looks forward to emancipation and security. These would largely be the absence of the omnipresent risk of interdiction and emancipation from the restrictions of depending of the goodwill and support of other for concealment, deception, survival or evasion.

A further analogy can drawn from Mutimer's thoughts for application in the realm of practicality of issues, hypotheses and concepts that are explored in this dissertation. In the absence of a laboratory in which the idiosyncratic circumstance surrounding the techniques of concealment, survival and evasion by a fugitive, this dissertation has undertaken to analyse various case studies that are from accounts of persons who are or were at one time considered to be criminal fugitives. Through the analyses, generalised concepts are deduced which may at some time in the future correspond to a real-time and real-life situations, giving a well trained individual an upper hand in a fugitive manhunt. A starting point would be comparative analysis being applied to newly established issues, hypotheses, laws and concepts, in order to determine their applicability and suitability, in real time and/or rapidly developing operational situations.

Theoretical research and analysis, therefore enables operations staff at command and field levels to obtain the ability to predict and anticipate the behaviour of emerging and long term fugitives leading to the enhancement of manhunt tradecrafts. Applicability of the vast libraries of concepts, laws, theories, hypotheses and techniques that are the result of analysis and research can only be judged upon success or failure to meet stated objectives in a manhunt; the interdiction of the fugitive in question.

The skill, intuition, qualification, intelligence or otherwise good judgement and vast knowledge of manhunt tradecrafts by an individual are another critical determinant. Finding and interdicting a fugitive, is always a matter of deliberation, even if an actual face-to-face encounter with the criminal fugitive is a matter of chance – an interdiction under any circumstance would entail deliberation with speed, skill and diligence.

CHAPTER 5 - SIGNIFICANCE OF MANHUNT TRADECRAFTS

From the analysed case studies, we are able to see that there are vital steps that must be taken in the process of conducting manhunts. These are generally referred to as manhunt tradecrafts. Manhunt tradecrafts, can be learnt and/or otherwise a matter of spontaneity and talent. It is very difficult to term specific tradecrafts as effective, for the circumstance of each manhunt varies greatly with others, but what can be advocated as best practice, is subject to analysis of past successes.

Some lessons from the Case Studies in Chapter 3:

1. Obtaining a clear definition as to the illegal/unacceptable conduct of a fugitive, is important – it gives search parties an unrelenting motivation in their endeavour to interdict the fugitive.
2. The informing of targeted segments of the population as to the wanted person status of a fugitive, should be undertaken. This can be done by way of mass media, flyers/leaflets or direct word of mouth, or by any other means appropriate for the case. Information given out should clearly identify the feed back channels an informant may resort to using. Another aspect of soliciting for the assistance of informants is that there must be ample provision for confidence building and confidentiality.
3. When information is requested from the public, there is FEEDBACK in return. Feedback may or may not be appropriate, but the key determinant of obtaining feedback is the public perception that interdiction of the

fugitive is for their own good. Questioning and assertions are also used to obtain feed back from subjects of a probe.

4. The desired type of feed back is an actionable first class intelligence report. Inevitably whatever the nature and number of sources only searches, surveillance and/or inspection, may be used to verify feed back from informants.
5. Intelligence obtained by way of feed back after a solicitation is only valuable if the search party has an operational and readily available interdiction mechanism on standby. Interdiction mechanisms vary on a case to case basis depending on the means available to a fugitive and/or their willingness to use violence/force to foil the interdiction. An interdiction mechanism could be ground, aerial and/or naval forces or simply a police man or civilian on foot patrol, as may be determined by the circumstances.
6. Training of search party on interdictions is a critical challenge more so due to the reducing or very rare opportunities for interdiction in the case of an effective fugitive. Furthermore, any unsuccessful attempt at interdiction of a rational fugitive, results in an ‘inoculation’ – the fugitive gets better at staying underground by way of concealment and evasion, thereby reducing any new opportunities for an interdiction.
7. Fugitive Psychology: The case studies on Winston Churchill, Imaculée Ilibagiza, Doug Hartman and Anne Frank, in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, are first hand accounts by fugitives themselves. These studies to some

extent, help us to get a grasp, into what psychological elements allowed for the success or failure at concealment, survival and evasion of the fugitives in question. There are a wide range of factors in these analyses, that enrich one's understanding of the thought and decision making processes of a fugitive. Understanding the mindset of a hunted person enables us to draw up a profile of likely and unlikely decisions that they are capable of. It is also possible to determine by way of profiling the most likely Human Intelligence Reservoirs, that may lead to valuable information resulting in a fugitive interdiction. This is illustrated by Wilhelm (2007) who quotes authorities in criminal profiling. He summarises the perception of various authorities, who were at the time focusing on a case of alleged murderer and fugitive Jesse Imeson. The first profiler of Imeson was Professor Paul Whitehead, a University of Western Ontario Professor specialising in Criminology – his opinion was that Imeson was, dangerous, desperate and ready and willing to use violence, to keep himself from being arrested. He had been on the run for one week and had only two options; to continue running or to stay static at a location. Whatever the choice the fugitive was to make, he would meet the following downsides of his decision: (a) as long as he kept on moving in the area of operations of the law enforcement agencies searching for him, the likelihood of him being spotted and positively identified increased. (b) the longer he stayed at the same hideaway, the more he had the psychological disposition that law enforcement agents were closing in on him. The result of Whitehead's

profile of Imeson, was an estimation that as a fugitive he would keep on the move and use deadly force to protect himself. Strengthening this analysis was a contribution by Brent E. Turrey, a U.S. Forensic Scientist and Profiler, who suggested that, ‘Imeson may commit more crimes, as he perceived that he had gone past a point of no return, and had nothing to lose’. Understanding a criminal fugitive is the domain of a profiler. Points of interest of profiling include: initial crime, *mens rea* and *actus reus* – the key line of inquiry is whether a crime was out of necessity or devious premeditation. Ultimately profilers help to estimate, at times with great accuracy, the whereabouts of even the most reclusive of fugitives.

8. Identification and Surveillance of Support Networks: Unless a fugitive is an absolute recluse, and depends entirely on hunting and gathering while having no form of contact with fellow humans, chances are that such persons have got support networks or at least a supporter. The use of supporters, by fugitives who have not abandoned the societies that have condemned them provides for the reduction in exposure to the public and access to essential services. By their very nature, support networks render services which are deemed to be illegal by the authorities in furtherance of the continued evasion and concealment of a fugitive from law enforcement authorities.

5.1 - IMPLICATIONS CAPTURING AND UTILISING THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN NATURE FOR FUGITIVE INTERDICTION

Considering that fugitives are human beings, they are prone to resort to their unique habits and desires. Understanding the unique background of an individual, is important if his/her presence signature, is to be isolated from the general background of humanity that conceals it and allows for the continued evasion of justice.

A good starting point of a manhunt, is the search for almost irrevocable human relations, between a fugitive and the wider society. Some representation of deeply entrenched relationships are of parental, sexual or socio-political nature. A network diagram, displaying these relations to a fugitive and their inter-relationships allows for the establishment of surveillance priorities and sequencing of interdiction activities. These network diagrams, also assist in the drafting of wholesome indictment documents should the interdiction of a fugitive result in his/her prosecution.

To those brought into the world by way of successive crime families, bending the law remains a most noble preoccupation, to the extent that observing it and submitting to the rule of civil authorities is a punishable act of treachery. Binding many such persons, into a life of crime are a wide range of customs, symbols and rites of passage. The detective who anticipates rituals and observances of crime families is more at ease when it comes to

developing surveillance or entrapment strategies. Continuous successful observances of rites of passage by criminals creates within them a sense of invincibility, belonging and purpose.

A good grasp of human nature also means, that a search party ought to understand the nature, capabilities and persuasion of its own personnel. Human nature entails being susceptible to forgetting, diversions, mediocrities and confusion. A search party must always have ways of stimulation and motivation, that keeps their attention focused, on the primary objective – interdiction of the fugitive in question. When a search party does not stick to a primary objective, the fugitive is likely to get relief by way of escaping from a difficult situation, such as an ambush or continuous surveillance.

The *underground threshold* is the point at which an individual accepts the harsh reality of becoming a fugitive or otherwise continuing an overt lifestyle and in turn losing his/her freedom, life or dignity. At this point in time, one is provoked by his/her perception of the society and/or authorities to take measures of personal concealment and evasion. The only method of stopping a criminal from going underground, is the undertaking of real time investigations, as soon as criminal activity is detected, and prompt preparation of indictment and undertaking of prosecutions. Secrecy at this point is critical if a criminal is not to detect a looming arrest and take the counter-measure of going underground.

A fugitive seeks or desires to improve his or her quality of life by way of constructing and administering a support network of like-minded non-fugitive persons. A support network is the greatest strength of a fugitive but once at least one member of support network has

been identified, and he/she is not aware of being placed under surveillance, the support network becomes the weak point of a fugitive's covert existence. The relationships between support networks and fugitives are rarely of a commercial nature and by their very make-up, they are not easily replaceable even if it comes to the attention of the fugitive that there is a potential for on-going surveillance. On the part of the surveillance team, their domain remains seeking evidence of extraordinary activity by the subject of surveillance that confirms the location of the fugitive, or actions that cannot be explained by his/her immediate needs.

Every fugitive, however well concealed or otherwise skilful at evasion, has got a unique presence signature. The epicentre of the presence signature is the location of the fugitive. A presence signature comprises a wide range of tangibles that emanate from the presence of the fugitive which includes but is not be limited to: security, biochemical, transport, supporters, etc. A presence signature is the first point of reference in the search for the fugitive. Once it has been located, a physical isolation of the epicentre can be taken in order to achieve an interdiction of the fugitive. There are innumerable ways of identifying and exploiting a presence signature of a fugitive depending on the capabilities of a search-interdiction team. The presence signature of a fugitive determines the actual methods that are utilised by a search party to effect an interdiction. A scientifically proven concept of a presence signature is the use of geographical profiling techniques, that are accurate to the extent that a criminal fugitive is a recidivist within a specific geographical area.

A search-interdiction team that is in the end successful, is likely to be one that is highly efficient at capturing and analysing evidence of presence signature however trivial, and fitting the gathered evidence into a wider picture of the manhunt. Such a search-interdiction team is highly likely to have correct surveillance and ambush priorities. A search-interdiction team should anticipate and exploit indicators demonstrating the fugitives, area of intentions, that are likely to be the theatre for future search-interdiction operations.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

Kiras(2007) in the text edited by Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Gray, C.S. & Cohen, E. (2007), is a paper by entitled Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency. To some extent this Security Studies paper covers a number of the themes of this dissertation. All transnational crime, acts of mega-terror, and the worst of human nature, stem from the initial thoughts and activities of just a single individual. If such persons could be detected, arrested and subjected to an effective application of penology, the welfare of society would be bettered.

In Kiras (2007), the first theme is that, ‘all forms of irregular warfare, including terrorism and insurgency, are appealing to those who seek a change in status quo against a more powerful adversary’. The implication is that if the individual(s) at the epicentre of a group engaging in irregular warfare are identified and subjected to an effective manhunt, then that may very well be the end of their operations. A clear hypothetic illustration, of this concept would have been if the Turks, during World War I, managed to interdict Col. T.E. Lawrence, who led an Arab guerrilla force during the period, 1916-18.

Another concept that comes to mind in the review, by Kiras (2007) is that of subversion, under which a country is out-administered and not out-fought. Subversion according to Kiras is a time consuming and resource-intensive activity. By its description, subversion must have at least a mastermind. When criminal organisations manage to obtain extraordinary profits within a country, they then seek to subvert its government in order that their criminal enterprise may continue to flourish. At the same time, before such subversion

becomes effective, the targeted state seeks to interdict the mastermind(s) of the subversive acts, in order to remain in control. The inevitable course of action for a government under such circumstances is to launch a manhunt for the mastermind(s) of the subversive criminal enterprise, who are usually fugitives. Kiras (2007) explores the idea of the *foco* by revolutionary Che Guevara, which in this case is the ‘centre of gravity of a guerrilla movement’. The *foco* is the initial critical mass of the guerrillas, the vanguard of the revolution and represents the military and political heart of an insurgency. Initially an insurgency is undertaken using criminal means and its leaders are fugitives. The *foco* concept, has a close resemblance to that of a fugitive epicentre and its presence signature.

Manhunts are a persistent problem in law-enforcement, and this dissertation, has sought to introduce solid operational concepts and methodologies of a professional endeavour that many today view as a black art. The methods explored in this dissertation appreciate the environment in which the public are co-operating in or otherwise hampering a manhunt. Though every criminal fugitive is unique, the methods described in this dissertation have got wide applicability and cannot be exhausted by their use in different cases within the same law enforcement jurisdiction, as each manhunt is unique.

6.1 - RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS

A wide range of issues, are covered in this dissertation, the primary objective being the enhancement of manhunts and clarity in the understanding of a fugitive's life. The dissertation covers issues such as:

1. how people become fugitives.
2. How people survive as fugitives.
3. Concealment and evasion by fugitives.
4. Enhancement of fugitive interdiction systems and processes.
5. Lessons learnt from case studies of fugitives – both successes and failures.

There are several concepts that have come about in this dissertation, as a result of theoretical analysis of manhunt tradecrafts and evaluation of various cases studies, these include:

- **Human Intelligence Reservoirs** – There are groups of people who have some parameters in common with a fugitive which make them more likely to have intelligence as to the whereabouts and/or activities of fugitives. Identifications of these reservoirs enhances the likelihood of positive results from the application of manhunt tradecrafts.
- **Symmetric Human Intelligence Reservoirs** – when a human intelligence reservoir, is apparently impermeable due to counter-intelligence checks and controls, a symmetric human intelligence reservoir, is sought to assist in giving insight into the activities and

whereabouts of a fugitive. An example is that if an organisation cannot be penetrated for purposes gathering intelligence on a fugitive, the family members of the members of that organisation, may be targeted as a symmetric human intelligence reservoir if they are likely to be in possession of the same intelligence by way of affiliation, but are not subject to counter-intelligence measures deployed at the targeted organisation.

- **Assertive Techniques of Gathering Human Intelligence** – both the methods of assertive belief and assertive disbelief are explored in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. They involve deployment of indirect verbal coercion, in a bid to get a subject to disclose specific intelligence.

- **Logical Fugitive Search Resource Traps** – this is a description of fugitive search operation intelligence collection and analysis methodology, that does not result in the interdiction of a fugitive, but are nevertheless erroneously reapplied without re-evaluation, resulting in the wastage of operational funds.

- **Fugitive Search Dysfunctional Monologue** – in many cases in which the search for a fugitive is publicised by law enforcement authorities, members of the public get involved. Due to the very nature of many fugitives, the methods and resources required for their interdiction are primarily held by the state’s law enforcement organs. Well qualified members of the public therefore, obtain important but inconclusive intelligence and forward it to the state. But they do not get feedback on progress even if it would help

them to better assist the state, which is the interpreter and exploiter of intelligence from members of the public. This results in the described monologue. Seeking feedback from the state in such cases can be frustrating or outright futile.

- **First Class Report** – the reader of this dissertation is also given some insight, into the quality of information, that is sought for by law enforcement in the event of a manhunt. This level of quality can be achieved in two ways, the first being by way of aggregation of information fed to law enforcement over a period of time, and the other being by way of a single report which can be sourced from a very skilful operative or a well placed individual.
- **Direct Overt Questioning with Deception** – most fugitive hunts are indeed a matter of life and death. The subjects of interrogations are aware of the stakes involved and are likely to give an inappropriate answer in a bid to shield the fugitive. Deception must therefore be applied, that is, the subjects of interrogation must be convinced by way of deception, that the question and the source of the question are in no way related to the activities of a manhunt.
- **Intra Search Space Point of Involuntary Transitory Convergence of a Fugitive** – the primary objective of a fugitive is to evade capture. In many instances, a fugitive may resort to using modes of transport that involuntarily take a fugitive back through the same way point on a route of flight from law enforcement; this a an intra search space point of

involuntary transitory convergence. A search-interdiction team, that can anticipate and exploit such an occurrence becomes highly efficient, in that particular manhunt.

- **The Proposition of the Perfectly Policed Search Space Syndrome** – this is an attempt to capture the reasons that prevents a fugitive from moving out of a search space. Fugitive psychology plays an important role in interdiction, as illustrated in the case studies.

- **Area of Intention(s)** – these are territory and locations currently out of the fugitive’s area of concealment, hideaway and evasion, but are likely to become suitable for the fugitives future survival.

- **Underground Threshold** – the point at which a person, accepts the reality of becoming a fugitive, and acts accordingly.

6.2 - LIMITATIONS

One aspect of manhunt operations that this dissertation does not seek to explore is that of operations funds. The general assumption is that to the average person, the chance of interdiction of many a fugitive, seems so remote to the extent that it cannot be funded by any conventional business methods. When dealing with a fugitive who has some knowledge of the tradecrafts, the chance of failure of a search-interdiction team are greatly magnified.

These are further magnified when the fugitive has got a robust support network, which is equally skilled in the tradecrafts of concealment and evasion.

Another factor unknown while undertaking this study, is the technological advantages that are available to search-interdiction parties. As such the emphasis is on the human element of a search-interdiction team participating in a manhunt. Though the case studies, demonstrate many situations where technologies are applicable, they nevertheless avoid the detailed specification and application of the same. This dissertation remains primarily an aid to enhancing man-applied tradecrafts.

6.3 - FUTURE RESEARCH

Some interesting areas of interest for further research on the topic of Intelligence Studies of fugitive emanating definitive and locational parameters, that would enhance manhunt tradecrafts and systems, if explored, include:

- application of artificial intelligence and information technology to reconcile a wide range of parameters, from agents, sensors, satellites, the Internet and other information technology devices
- Areas specific case studies, that have an emphasis on specific methods and success rates of search-interdiction teams.
- Determining correlation between fugitive psychology and choice of hiding places, given specific options available to a fugitive.

- Study, advice and documentation of on-going manhunts.

The general trend in manhunts is that those involved never release complete operational details due to the perception that future situations may arise that warrant the application of past methods. Some of the mistakes made by fugitives are simple and easily avoidable, while at the same time law enforcement may make simple and intuitive breakthroughs, after many futile attempts at complex and systematic search. This dissertation captures the very essence of pure human effort that could be enhanced in many other ways.

Collins, L. & Lapierre, D. (1988), offers some interesting insight into the manhunt tradecrafts from the perspectives of both the hunters and the hunted, with cases of role reversals in some instances. For example the basing of an *Hagannah* (Jewish underground group) hideout close to the headquarters of the British Security Police, who had been involved in a protracted manhunt against its top members. Others include concealment of an arms workshop in a laundry that was patronised by the British military who were actively seeking to interdict Jewish subversives that were operating such establishments. Instances such as the flight of the mufti of Jerusalem, disguised as a beggar. An example of the importance of an epicentre is the death of the fugitive leader Abu Khader Husseini, which completely disorganised the effort of other communities in Jerusalem to effectively challenge the *Hagannah*.

This dissertation is researched to make you are better placed to bring to closure many other criminal fugitive cases or to otherwise assist mankind in refining the tradecrafts of utilising locational and definitive parameters, to hunt down even the most reclusive fugitive.

...THE END...

APPENDICES


TABLE 1 – SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES

Case Study	Fugitive Emanating Definitive Parameter	Fugitive Emanating Locational Parameter	Parameter Acquisition Methodology	Fugitive Interdiction Solution Deployed
a. Bernard Matheri Thuo alias Rasta	Violent behaviour & marital partner - wife	Home / house of wife	Informers	Ambush
b. alias Sophia Abdi	Narcotics trafficking	Point of Entry	Inspection	Arrest
c. Wakinyonga	Facial Recognition	Personal declaration	Informers	Ambush
d. Joseph Kony	Violent behaviour	Combat formations	Military Surveillance	Ambush (Failed)
e. Osama bin Laden	Anthropometrics	Security presence	Military Surveillance	Ambush (Failed)
f. Winston Churchill	Facial recognition	Home of friend	Blanket search	Assault (Failed)
g. Imaculée Ilibagiza	Facial recognition	Home of friend	Blanket search	Arrest (Failed)
h. Roman Shukheyevich	Violent behaviour	Presence of support network	Direct overt questions with deception	Assault
i. Doug Hartman	Facial recognition	Urban areas	Facial identification	Arrest
j. Raila Amolo Odinga	Facial recognition	Home and Business addresses	Targeted/selective surveillance	Arrest (Failed)
k. Anne Frank	Anthropometrics	Home cum hideaway	Informers	Arrested
l. Clyde Champion Barrow	Facial recognition	Time and choice of route	Informers	Assault

TABLE 2 – QUALIFICATION OF FUGITIVE EMANATING LOCATIONAL AND DEFINITIVE PARAMETERS

Utility Classes of Parameters	Source of Parameter	Complexity of required determination systems
1 st class - Leads directly to location, identification and capture of fugitives	Emanating directly from fugitive	Low (L)
2 nd class - Leads indirectly to location identification and capture of fugitive	Emanating indirectly from fugitive	Medium (M)
3 rd class - Of no use whatsoever in location, identification and capture of fugitive	Wrongly assumed to be emanating (in)directly from fugitive	High (H)

FUGITIVE PRESENCE SIGNATURE



PRIORITIZING FUGITIVE SEARCHES BY WAY OF PARAMETER
INTERPRETATION
THE “SEARCH LIGHT” DIAGRAM
 COMPLEXITY OF INTERPRETATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR DETERMINATION OF FUGITIVE
 EMANATING PARAMETERS





ILLUSTRATION OF THE UNDERGROUND THRESHOLD TO BECOMING A FUGITIVE



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